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The historical frequency of banking crises is quite similar in high- and middle-to-low-income countries,
with quantitative and qualitative parallels in both the run-ups and the aftermath.   We establish these
regularities using a unique dataset spanning from Denmark's financial panic during the Napoleonic
War to the ongoing global financial crisis sparked by subprime mortgage defaults in the United States.
Banking crises dramatically weaken fiscal positions in both groups, with government revenues invariably
contracting, and fiscal expenditures often expanding sharply.  Three years after a financial crisis central
government debt increases, on average, by about 86 percent.  Thus the fiscal burden of banking crisis
extends far beyond the commonly cited cost of the bailouts.  Our new dataset includes housing price
data for emerging markets; these allow us to show that the real estate price cycles around banking
crises are similar in duration and amplitude to those in advanced economies, with the busts averaging
four to six years.  Corroborating earlier work, we find that systemic banking crises are typically preceded
by asset price bubbles, large capital inflows and credit booms, in rich and poor countries alike.
Carmen M. Reinhart
University of Maryland
School of Public Policy
and Department of Economics
4105 Van Munching Hall











I.  Introduction 
Until very recently, the study of banking crises has typically focused either on earlier 
historical experiences in advanced countries, mainly the banking panics before World War II, or 
else has focused on modern-day emerging market experiences.
1 This dichotomy is perhaps 
shaped by the belief that for advanced economies, destabilizing, systemic, multi-country 
financial crises were a relic of the past.
2  Of course, the recent global financial crisis emanating 
out of the United States and Europe has dashed this misconception, albeit at great social cost. 
As this paper will demonstrate, banking crises have long been an equal opportunity 
menace. We develop this finding using a core sample of sixty-six countries (plus a broader 
extended sample for some exercises).
 3  We examine banking crises ranging from Denmark’s 
financial panic during the Napoleonic War to the current “first global financial crisis of the 21
st 
century.”  The incidence of banking crises proves to be remarkably similar in the high- and 
middle-to-low-income countries.  Indeed, the tally of crises is particularly high for the world’s 
financial centers: the United Kingdom, the United States, and France.  Perhaps more surprising 
still are the qualitative and quantitative parallels across disparate income groups.  These parallels 
arise despite the relatively pristine modern sovereign default records of the rich countries.   
Three features of our expansive dataset are of particular note.  First, our data on global 
banking crises go back to 1800, extending the careful study of Bordo, et al. (2001) that covers 
                                                 
1 See Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Gorton (1988) on pre–WWII banking panics; Sundararajan and Baliño 
(1991) for several emerging market case studies; Jácome (2008) on banking crises in Latin America. 
2 Studies that encompass episodes in both advanced and emerging economies include Bordo et al. (2001), 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). 
3 The core sample spans 66 advanced and emerging market economies in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin and North 
America and Oceania; see Appendix Table A1.  The extended sample includes all countries, see Table A3. 
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back to 1880.  Second, to our knowledge, we are the first to examine the patterns of housing 
prices around major banking crises in emerging markets, including Asia, Europe and Latin 
America. Our emerging market data set facilitates comparisons, across both duration and 
magnitude, with the better-documented housing price cycles in the advanced economies, which 
have long been known to play a central role in financial crises.
4 We find that real estate price 
cycles around banking crises are similar in duration and amplitude across the two groups of 
countries.  This result is surprising given that almost all other macroeconomic and financial time 
series (income, consumption, government spending, interest rates, etc.) exhibit higher volatility 
in emerging markets.
5  
Third, our analysis employs the comprehensive historical data on central government tax 
revenues and debt compiled in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a,c).  These new data afford a new 
perspective on the tax and debt consequences of the banking crises (Previously, the kind of 
historical data on debt necessary to analyze the aftermath of banking crises across countries was 
virtually non-existent for years prior to 1990.
6)   
 We find that banking crises almost invariably lead to sharp declines in tax revenues as 
well significant increases in government spending (a share of which is presumably dissipative).  
On average, government debt rises by 86 percent during the three years following a banking 
crisis.  These indirect fiscal consequences are thus an order of magnitude larger than the usual 
bank bailout costs that are the centerpiece of most previous studies.  That fact that the 
magnitudes are comparable in advanced and emerging market economies is also quite 
remarkable. Obviously, both the bailout costs and the fiscal costs depend on a host of political 
                                                 
4 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) for an analysis of all post–WWII banking crises in advanced economies. 
5 See, for instance, Agénor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000). 
6 Bordo and Meissner (2006) offer domestic debt data for selected years across 30 countries for 1880–1913, while 
Jeanne and Guscina (2006) provide domestic debt for 19 countries for 1980–2005.  The Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008c) time series for sixty-six countries spans 1913–2007, and much earlier for a large subset of these countries.   3
and economic factors, including especially the policy response as well as the severity of the real 
shock which, typically, triggers the crisis.
7   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II provides an overview of the history of 
banking crises, with particular emphasis on the post-1900 experience.  We also document the 
incidence and frequency of banking crises by country and by region.  We discuss the links 
between banking crises, financial liberalization, the degree of capital mobility, and sovereign 
debt crises and discuss international financial contagion.   
Section III examines some of the common features in the run-up to banking crises 
across countries and regions over time.  The focus is on the systematic links between cycles in 
international capital flows, credit, and asset prices—specifically, home and equity prices.  The 
next section examines some of the common features of the aftermath of banking crises. We 
document the toll that the crisis takes on output and government revenues, as well as the 
typically profound effect on the evolution of government debt during the years following the 
crisis.  The concluding section takes up the question of “graduation.”  Specifically, to what 
extent do countries ever “graduate” from (stop experiencing) serial major financial crises as they 
seem to graduate from serial sovereign debt crises?
8 
 
                                                 
7 Reinhart and Rogoff 2008a,c show that output growth typically decelerates in advance of a crisis. 
8 An example of graduate from serial default is France, which defaulted 8 times on its external debt between 1500 
and 1800, but has not defaulted since.   4
II.  Banking Crises in Historical Perspective 
We begin this section by providing an overview of the evolution of banking crises 
through history.  To do so, it is necessary to first identify and date banking crisis episodes.  Our 
approach, which follows the standard methodology in the literature (e.g., Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999, Bordo, et al., 2001, and Caprio and Klingebiel, 2005, among others), is 
documented in detail in the appendix, along with our principal bibliographical sources. 
9  
One dimension that distinguishes this study from previous efforts is that our dating of 
crises extends far before the much-studied modern post–World War II era.  Specifically, we start 
in 1800.  Our work was greatly simplified back to 1880 by the careful study of Bordo, et al. 
(2001), but for the earlier period we had to resort to old and often obscure works. The earliest 
advanced-economy banking crisis in our sample is France 1802; early crises in emerging markets 
befell India, 1863, China (several episodes during the 1860s–1870s), and Peru in 1873. 
10 
It may come as a surprise to the reader that previous attempts to document banking crises 
for the pre–World War II period are so limited. The problem is that because domestic banking 
crises do not typically impinge on large powerful creditors in the international financial centers, 
they do not leave the same imprint on the global press as, say, sovereign external defaults. For 
this reason, we acknowledge that despite our best efforts, our chronology may be missing a 
number of banking crises in emerging markets prior to World War II.
 11   Fortunately, banking 




                                                 
9 See also Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
10 The work of Andrea McElderry (1976) and Cheng (2003) was invaluable in developing the timeline for China.  
The Peruvian case comes from a little-known 1957 book published in Lima by Carlos Camprubí Alcázar. 
11 The challenges encountered in dating banking crises are along similar lines as those faced when trying to 
construct a chronology of sovereign default on domestic debt, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c).   5
 
The Big Picture: Banking and Sovereign Debt Crises 
  Figure 1 plots the incidence of banking crises among the countries in our sample (which 
account for about 90 percent of world GDP).  Specifically, the figure shows the percentage of all 
independent countries during 1900–2008 having a banking crisis in any given year.  The tally 
weighs countries by their share of global GDP.  This weighted aggregate is meant to provide a 
measure of the “global” impact of individual banking crises.  As such, a crisis in the United 
States or Germany is accorded a much higher weight than a crisis in Angola or Honduras, all of 
which are part of our 66-country sample.   6
Figure 1 
Proportion of Countries with Banking Crises, 1900-2008
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The First Global Financial Crisis of 21st 
Century 
 
Sources: Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Jácome (2008), Maddison (2003), 
and additional sources listed in Appendix II, which provides banking crises dates. 
Notes: Sample size includes all 66 countries listed in TableA1 that were independent states in the given year. Three 
sets of GDP weights are used, 1913 weights for the period 1800–1913, 1990 for the period 1914–1990, and finally 
2003 weights for the period 1991–2006. The entries for 2007–2008 list crises in Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The figure shows a three-year 
moving average. 
 
It is no surprise that the worldwide Great Depression of the 1930s posts the highest 
readings of banking crises during this 109-year stretch.  Earlier, less widespread, “waves” of 
global financial stress are evident during and around the Panic of 1907 that originated in New 
York, as well as the crises accompanying the outbreak of the First World War.  Another striking 
feature of Figure 1 is the relative calm during the late 1940s to the early 1970s.  This calm may 
be partly explained by booming world growth, but perhaps more so by the repression of the 
domestic financial markets (in varying degrees) and the heavy-handed use of capital controls that 
followed for many years after World War II. (We are not necessarily implying that such 
repression and controls are the right approach to dealing with the risk of financial crises.)   7
 Since the early 1970s, financial and international capital account liberalization took 
root worldwide. So, too, have banking crises. After a long hiatus, the share of countries having 
banking difficulties first began to expand in the 1970s.  The break-up of the Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates together with the sharp spike in oil prices catalyzed a prolonged 
global recession, resulting in financial sector difficulties in a number of advanced economies.  In 
the early 1980s, a collapse in global commodity prices combined with high and volatile interest 
rates in the United States contributed to a spate of banking and sovereign debt crises in emerging 
economies, most famously in Latin America and then Africa. 
The United States had its savings and loan crisis beginning in 1984.  During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the Nordic countries experienced some of the worst banking crises the 
wealthy economies had known in post–WWII following a surge in capital inflows and real estate 
prices.  In 1992, Japan’s asset price bubble burst and ushered in a decade-long banking crisis.  
Around the same time, with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, several formerly communist 
countries in Eastern Europe soon joined the ranks of nations facing banking sector problems. As 
the second half of the 1990s approached, emerging markets quickly faced a fresh round of 
banking crisis.  Problems in Mexico and Argentina (1994–1995) were followed by the famous 
Asian crisis of 1997–1998, and then the troubles of Russia and Colombia, among others.
12  
Argentina in 2001 and Uruguay in 2002 closed that upswing in the banking crisis cycle. 
A brief tranquil period came to an abrupt halt in the summer of 2007 when the subprime 
crisis in the United States began in earnest, soon morphing into a global financial crisis.
13 
                                                 
12 While China’s heavy-handed capital controls shielded it from contagious currency crashes during Asia’s turmoil, 
it did not protect it from a systemic and costly banking crisis emanating primarily from large-scale lending to 
inefficient and bankrupt state-owned enterprises. 
13 Figure 1 does not fully capture the extent of the present upsurge in financial crises, as Ireland and Iceland (both 
having banking crises at the time of this writing) are not part of our core 66-country sample.   8
A high incidence of global banking crises has historically been associated with a high 
incidence of sovereign defaults of external debt. Figure 2 plots the (GDP-weighted) share of 
countries experiencing a banking crisis, as shown in Figure 1 and described above, against the 
comparably calculated share of countries experiencing a default or restructuring in their external 
debt.  Sovereign defaults begin to climb with the onset of WWI (as do banking crises) and 
continue to escalate during the Great Depression and World War II. The decades that follow are 
relatively quiet, until debt crises sweep emerging markets beginning in the 1980s.
14 It remains to 
be seen whether the recent global surge in financial sector turbulence will lead to a similar 
outcome in the sovereign default cycle.  Figure 2 suggests that a sharp rise in sovereign defaults 
would hardly be surprising. 
                                                 
14 Note that in Figure 2 the debt crises of the 1980s do not loom as large as the previous cycle of defaults, as only 
middle- and low-income countries faced default, while in addition to emerging market economies several advanced 
economies defaulted during the Great Depression and several more defaulted during WWII.   9
Figure 2 
Proportion of Countries with Banking and Debt Crises




































































Banking Crises Debt Crises
 
Sources: Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Jácome (2008), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Lindert and 
Morton (1989), Macdonald (2003), Maddison (2003), Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 
(2003), Suter (1992), and Standard and Poor’s (various years). 
Notes: Sample size includes all countries, out of a total of sixty-six listed in Table 1 that were independent states in 
the given year. Three sets of GDP weights are used, 1913 weights for the period 1800–1913, 1990 for the period 
1914–1990, and finally 2003 weights for the period 1991–2006. The entries for 2007–2008 list crises in Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The figure 
shows a three-year moving average. 
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Banking Crises: An Equal Opportunity Menace 
  In earlier papers, we have shown that the frequency of a default (or restructuring) on 
external debt is significantly lower for advanced economies than for emerging markets.  For 
many high-income countries, that frequency has effectively been zero since 1800.
15  Even 
countries with a long history of multiple defaults prior to 1800, countries such as France and 
Spain, present evidence of having “graduated” from serial default on external debt. 
The second column in Tables 1 and 2 highlights the vast differences between emerging 
markets (notably in Africa and in Latin America—but even in several countries in Asia) and 
high-income Western Europe, North America and Oceania.  The third column of Tables 1 and 2 
present the analogous calculation for each country for banking crises (i.e., number of years in 
banking crises, according to the extended dataset developed here, divided by the number of years 
since independence or since 1800—if independence was earlier).  One striking observation from 
Tables 1 and 2 is that the average length of time spent in a state of sovereign default is far above 
the average amount of time spent in a financial crisis.  A country can circumvent its external 
creditors for an extended period.  It is far more costly to leave a domestic banking crisis hanging, 
due to the crippling effects on trade and investment. 
                                                 
15 We do recognize, however, that the wide-spread abrogation of gold clauses—on domestic debt—during the 
1930s’ Great Depression by the United States and other developed economies were de facto sovereign defaults   11
Table 1. Debt and Banking Crises: Africa and Asia, 






Share of years in default 
or rescheduling since 
independence or 1800  
 
Share of years in a 
banking crisis since 




    
Algeria   13.3  6.4 
Angola   59.4  17.6 
Central African Republic   53.2  38.8 
Cote D’Ivoire   48.9  8.2 
Egypt   3.4  5.6 
Kenya   13.6 19.6 
Mauritius   0.0  2.4 
Morocco   15.7  3.8 
Nigeria   21.3 10.2 
South Africa   5.2 6.3 
Tunisia   9.6  9.6 
Zambia   27.9  2.2 
Zimbabwe   40.5 27.3 
Asia      
China   13.0 9.1 
India   11.7  8.6 
Indonesia   15.5 13.3 
Japan   5.3 8.1 
Korea   0.0  17.2 
Malaysia   0.0  17.3 
Myanmar   8.5  13.1 
Philippines   16.4 19.0 
Singapore   0.0  2.3 
Sri Lanka   6.8 8.2 
Taiwan   0.0  11.7 
Thailand   0.0  6.7 
 
1 For countries that became independent prior to 1800 the calculations are for 1800–2006. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Jácome 
(2008), Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources cited 
therein. See also Appendix II.  
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Table 2. Debt and Banking Crises: Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania, 






Share of years in default 
or rescheduling since 
independence or 1800  
 
Share of years in a 
banking crisis since 
independence or 1800  
 
Europe      
Austria     17.4    1.9 
Belgium     0.0   7.3 
Denmark     0.0   7.2 
Finland     0.0   8.7 
France     0.0    11.5 
Germany     13.0    6.2 
Greece     50.6    4.4 
Hungary     37.1    6.6 
Italy     3.4   8.7 
Netherlands     6.3   1.9 
Norway     0.0    15.7 
Poland     32.6    5.6 
Portugal     10.6    2.4 
Romania     23.3    7.8 
Russia     39.1    1.0 
Spain     23.7    8.1 
Sweden     0.0   4.8 
Turkey     15.5    2.4 
United  Kingdom     0.0   9.2 
Latin America        
Argentina     32.5    8.8 
Bolivia     22.0    4.3 
Brazil     25.4    9.1   
Chile     27.5    5.3   
Colombia     36.2    3.7 
Costa Rica     38.2    2.7   
Dominican Republic      29.0    1.2 
Ecuador     58.2    5.6 
El Salvador      26.3    1.1 
Guatemala     34.4    1.6 
Honduras     64.0    1.1 
Mexico     44.6    9.7 
Nicaragua     45.2    5.4 
Panama     27.9    1.9 
Paraguay     23.0    3.1 
Peru     40.3    4.3 
Uruguay     12.8    3.1 
Venezuela     38.4    6.2   
North America      
Canada     0.0   8.5 
United States      0.0    13.0 
Oceania      
Australia     0.0   5.7 
New  Zealand     0.0   4.0 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Jácome 
(2008), Standard and Poor’s, Purcell and Kaufman (1993), Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003) and sources cited 
therein. See also Appendix II.   13
 
  Tables 3 and 4 present a different perspective on the prevalence of banking crises.  The 
second column tallies the number of banking crises (rather than the number of years in crisis) 
since independence or 1800; while the third narrows the window to the post–WWII period.  
Several features are worth noting.  For the advanced economies during the full sample, the 
picture that emerges is one of serial banking crises.  The world’s financial centers, the United 
Kingdom, the United States and France stand out in this regard, with 12, 13, and 15 banking 
crisis episodes, respectively.  The frequency of banking crises drops off markedly for the 
advanced economies and the larger emerging markets alike during post–WWII.  However, all 
except Portugal experienced at least one post-War crisis prior to the current episode.  When the 
present wave of crises is fully factored in, the apparent drop will likely be even less pronounced.  
Thus, while many now-advanced economies have graduated from a history of serial default on 
sovereign debt, or very high inflation (above 20 percent), graduation from banking crises has 
proven, so far, virtually impossible.  Indeed, Tables 1–4 illustrate that despite dramatic 
differences in recent sovereign default performance, the incidence of banking crises is about the 
same for advanced economies as for emerging markets.  It also should be noted that as financial 




   
                                                 
16 As we have already acknowledged, our accounting of financial crises in poorer countries may be incomplete, 
especially for earlier periods, despite our best efforts.   14







Number of banking 
crises since 
independence or 1800  
 
Number of banking 
crises since 




    
Algeria   1  1 
Angola   1  1 
Central African Republic   2  2 
Cote D’Ivoire   1  1 
Egypt   3  2 
Kenya   2  2 
Mauritius   1  1 
Morocco   1  1 
Nigeria   1  1 
South Africa 
1    6  2 
Tunisia   1  1 
Zambia   1  1 
Zimbabwe   1  1 
Asia      
China   10  1 
India 
1   6  1 
Indonesia   3  3 
Japan   8  2 
Korea   3  3 
Malaysia   2  2 
Myanmar   1  1 
Philippines   2  2 
Singapore   1  1 
Sri Lanka   1  1 
Taiwan 
1   5  3 
Thailand   2  2 
 
1 For South Africa the calculations are for 1850–2008; for India these are for 1800–2008. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and 
Jácome (2008). See also Appendix II. 
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Table 4.  Frequency of Banking Crises: Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania, 






Number of banking 
crises since 
independence or 1800 
 
Number of banking 
crises since 
independence or 1945  
 
Europe      
Austria   3  1 
Belgium   10  1 
Denmark   10  1 
Finland   5  1 
France   15  1 
Germany   8  2 
Greece   2  1 
Hungary   2  2 
Italy   11  1 
Netherlands   4  1 
Norway   6  1 
Poland   1  1 
Portugal   5  0 
Romania   1  1 
Russia   2  2 
Spain   8  2 
Sweden   5  1 
Turkey   2  2 
United Kingdom    12  4 
Latin America        
Argentina   9  4 
Bolivia   3  3 
Brazil   11  3   
Chile   7  2   
Colombia   2  2 
Costa Rica   2  2 
Dominican Republic    2  2 
Ecuador   2  2 
El Salvador    2  2 
Guatemala   3  2 
Honduras   1  1 
Mexico   7  2 
Nicaragua   1  1 
Panama   1  1 
Paraguay   2  1 
Peru   3  1 
Uruguay   5  2 
Venezuela   2  2 
North America      
Canada   8  1 
United States    13  2 
Oceania      
Australia   3  2 
New Zealand    1  1 
1 For countries that became independent prior to 1800 the calculations are for 1800–2006. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and 
Jácome (2008). See also Appendix II.    16
Summary Tables by Region of Frequency of Banking Crises, 1800-2007, and 1945-2007 
 
Tables 5a and 5b summarize, by region, the evidence on the number of banking crises 
and share of years in banking crisis.  Table 5a starts in 1800. (The table only includes post 
independence crises, which explains why emerging markets have lower cumulative totals since 
1800.) Table 5b gives the evidence for post-1945. 
 
Table 5a: Summary on the Incidence and Frequency of Banking Crises:  
1800 (or independence)–2008 
 
Region/Group  Share of years in a banking crisis 
since independence or 1800 







Asia 11.2  3.6 
Europe 6.3  5.9 
Latin America  4.4  3.6 
Of which: Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico 
9.2 9.0 
North America  11.2  10.5 
Oceania 4.8  2.0 
Advanced 7.2  7.2 
Emerging 8.3  2.8 
 
Table 5b: Summary on the Incidence and Frequency of Banking Crises:  
1945 (or independence)–2008 
 
Region/Group  Share of years in a banking crisis 
since independence or 1800 
Number of banking crises 
Africa 12.3  1.3 
Asia 12.4  1.8 
Europe 7.1  1.4 
Latin America  9.7  2.0 
Of which: Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico 
13.5 3.0 
North America  8.6  1.5 
Oceania 7.0  1.5 
Advanced 7.0  1.4 
Emerging 10.8  1.7 
Notes: Advanced economies are comprised of North America, Oceania, Japan and all European countries not listed 
below as part of emerging Europe.  Emerging economies consist of Africa, all Asian countries except Japan, Latin 
America, and emerging Europe (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Turkey). 
Sources: based on Tables 1–4.   17
Whether the calculations are done from 1800 (Table 5a) or from 1945 (Table 5b), on average 
there are no significant differences in either the incidence or number of banking crises 
between advanced and emerging economies—banking crises are an equal opportunity 
menace. In fact, prior to WWII the advanced economies with their more developed financial 
systems were more prone to banking crises than many of the smaller low income counterparts. 
17 
The Bunching of Banking Crises: Contagion or Common Fundamentals? 
  In this section, we discuss the bunching of banking crises across countries that is so 
evident in the late-2000s case, where both common shocks (the bursting of the global housing 
bubble) and cross-country linkages (for example, because many countries bought U.S. subprime 
mortgage debt) are evident. 
  Bordo and Murshid (2001) and Neal and Weidenmier (2003) have pointed out that cross-
country correlations in banking crises were also common during 1880–1913, a period of 
relatively high international capital mobility under the gold standard. 
18  Table 6 looks at a 
broader time span including the twentieth century; the table lists the years during which banking 
crises are bunched; greater detail on individual country dates is provided in Appendix A3.
19   The 
famous Baring crisis of 1890 (which involved Argentina and the U.K. before spreading 
elsewhere) appears to be the first episode of international bunching of banking crises; this was 
followed by the panic of 1907, which began in the United States and quickly spread to other 
                                                 
17 On average, 7.2 crises for the advanced versus 2.8 for the emerging market countries (Table 5a). 
18 Bordo and Murshid (2001) look at the period 1880–1913.  Neal and Weidenmier (2003) emphasize that periods of 
apparent contagion can be more readily interpreted as responses to common shocks, an issue we return to in the 
context of the present crisis.  But, perhaps, the bottom line as regards a historical perspective on financial contagion 
is best summarized by Bordo and Murshid (2001), who conclude that “there is little evidence to suggest that cross-
country linkages are tighter in the aftermath of a financial crisis for the recent period” (as opposed to 1880–1913, the 
earlier heyday of globalization in financial markets that they study).   
19 Table 6 does not include the bunching of other “types” of crises, such as the wave of sovereign defaults during 
1825 or the currency crashes/debasements of the Napoleonic Wars.   18
advanced economies (particularly, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, and Sweden).  These episodes 
are reasonable benchmarks for modern-day financial contagion. 
20  
Of course, other pre–World War II episodes of banking crisis contagion pale when 
confronted with the Great Depression (which also saw a large bunching in sovereign debt 
defaults, as seen earlier in Figure 2). 
                                                 
20 See, Neal and Weidenmeir (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a).   19
Table 6. Global Banking Crises, 1890–2008: 
Contagion or Common Fundamentals? 
Years of bunching in banking 
crises 
Affected countries  Comments 
1890–1891  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Portugal, UK, and US 
Argentina defaults and there are 
runs on all Argentine banks (see 
della Paolera and Taylor (2001); 
Baring Brothers faces failure. 
1907–1908  Chile, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Japan, Mexico, Sweden, US 
A fall in copper prices 
undermines the solvency of a 
trust company (quasi bank) in 
NewYork. 
1914  Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, 
France, India, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, UK, and 
US 
The outbreak of WWI 
1929–1931  Advanced: Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, US 
Emerging markets: Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, Mexico 
Real commodity prices collapse 
by about 51 percent during 1928–
1931. Real interest rates reach 
almost 13 percent in the US. 
1981–1982  Emerging markets: Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, Congo, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Mexico, 
the Philippines, Turkey, and 
Uruguay 
Between 1979 and 1982, real 
commodity prices fall about 40 
percent. US real interest rates hit 
about 6 percent—their highest 
readings since 1933. The 
beginning of the decade-long debt 
crisis in emerging markets. 
1987–1988  Many small, mostly low-income 
countries, Sub-Saharan Africa-
particularly hard hit. 
The tail-end of a nearly decade-
long debt crisis. 
1991–1992  Advanced: Czech Republic, 
Finland, Greece, Japan, Sweden 
Others: Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, 
Georgia, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic 
Real estate and equity price 
bubbles in the Nordic countries 
and Japan burst; many transition 
economies cope with 
liberalization and stabilization. 
1994–1995  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and Paraguay 
Others: Azerbaijan, Croatia, 
Cameroon, Lithuania, Swaziland  
The Mexican “tequila” crisis 
deals the first blow to the surge in 
capital inflows to emerging 
markets since the early 1990s. 
1997–1998  Asia: Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam 
Others: Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mauritius, Russia, 
Ukraine 
The second and last blow to 
capital flows to merging markets 
2007--present  Germany, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Japan, Spain, UK, US 
and others 
The US subprime real estate 
bubble—and other real estate 
bubbles in advance economies 
   20
 
The Late 2000s Global Financial Crisis 
 
  The current conjuncture is illustrative of the two channels of contagion, linkages and 
common shocks.   There is little doubt that the U.S. crisis has spilled over into other markets 
through direct linkages. For example, German and Japanese financial institutions  (and others 
ranging as far as Kazakhstan) sought more attractive returns in the U.S. subprime market, 
perhaps owing to the fact that profit opportunities in domestic real estate were limited at best and 
dismal at worst (Figure 3).  Indeed, after the fact, it has become evident that many financial 
institutions outside the United States had nontrivial exposure to the U.S. subprime market.
21  
This is a classic channel of transmission or contagion, through which a crisis in one country 
spreads across international borders.  In the present context, however, contagion or spillovers are 
only part of the story. 
That many other countries are experiencing economic difficulties at the same time as the 
United States also owes importantly to the fact that many of the features that characterized the 
run-up to the subprime crisis in the United States were present in many other advanced 
economies. Specifically, many countries in Europe and elsewhere (New Zealand, for example) 
were having their own home-grown real estate bubbles (Figure 3).  This, in and of itself, makes 
these countries vulnerable to the usual nasty consequences of asset market crashes—irrespective 
of what may be happening in the United States.  
                                                 
21 Owing to the opaqueness of balance sheets in many financial institutions in these countries, the full extent of 
exposure is, as yet, unknown.   21
Figure 3  
Percent Change in Real Housing Prices: 
2002-2006













































Red, indicates financial crisis during 2007-2008
New Zealand 
 
Sources: Bank of International Settlements and sources listed in Table A4. China data covers 2003–2006.    22
 
Banking Crises, Capital Mobility, And Financial Liberalization 
Also consonant with the modern theory of crises is the striking correlation between freer 
capital mobility and the incidence of banking crises, as shown in Figure 4.  Periods of high 
international capital mobility have repeatedly produced international banking crises, not only 
famously as they did in the 1990s, but historically.  The figure plots a three-year moving 
average of the share of all countries experiencing banking crises on the right scale.  On the left 
scale, we graph the index of capital mobility, due to Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), updated and 
back cast using their same design principle, to cover our full sample period.  While the Obstfeld–
Taylor index may have its limitations, we feel it nevertheless provides a concise summary of 
complicated forces by emphasizing de facto capital mobility based on actual flows.  
For the post-1970 period, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present formal evidence on the 
links of crises with financial liberalization.  In 18 of the 26 banking crises they study, the 
financial sector had been liberalized within the preceding five years, usually less.  In the 1980s 
and 1990s most liberalization episodes were associated with financial crises of varying severity.  
Only in a handful of countries (for instance, Canada) did financial sector liberalization proceed 
smoothly.  Specifically, the paper presents evidence that the probability of a banking crisis 
conditional on financial liberalization having taken place is higher than the unconditional 
probability of a banking crisis; probit analysis confirmed these results. Using a 53-country 
sample for the period 1980–1995 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) also show, in the 
context of a multivariate logit model, that financial liberalization has an independent negative 
effect on banking sector stability and that this result is robust across numerous specifications. 
22 
                                                 
22 See also, Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) for an insightful discussion of the Nordic experience with financial 
liberalization.   23
The stylized evidence presented in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) suggests that inadequate 
regulation and lack of supervision at the time of the liberalization may play a key role in 
explaining why deregulation and banking crises are so closely entwined.  Again, this is a theme 
across developed countries and emerging markets alike. 
Figure 4 
















































Sources:   Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio et al. (2005), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), and 
these authors. 
Notes: This sample includes all countries (even those not in our core sample of 66).  The full listing of  banking 
crises dates are shown in Appendix II. On the left scale, we updated our favorite index of capital mobility, 
admittedly arbitrary, but a concise summary of complicated forces.  The smooth red line shows the judgmental index 
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III. Capital Flow Bonanzas, Credit Cycles and Asset Prices 
This section examines some of the common features of banking crises across countries, 
regions and time. The focus is on the regularities among cycles in international capital flows, 
credit, and asset prices  (specifically, housing and equity prices). 
Capital flow bonanzas and crisis vulnerability 
One common characteristic of the run-up to banking crises is a sustained surge in capital 
inflows.  Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) delineate a criterion to define a capital flow bonanza, 
catalogue (country-by-country) “bonanza” 
23 episodes for 1960–2006, and examined the links 
between bonanza spells and banking crises, employing the crisis dates defined and dated in the 
Appendix to the present paper. 
24  
  From the Appendix crises dates and the bonanza dates, two country-specific probabilities 
were calculated.  The unconditional probability of a banking crisis, along the lines of those 
shown in Tables 1 and 2 (except for 1960–2007), and the probability of a banking crisis within a 
window of three years before and after the bonanza year or years—that is, as the conditional 
probability of a crisis.  If capital flow bonanzas make countries more crises prone, the 
conditional probability, P(Crisis│Bonanza) should be greater than the unconditional probability 
of a crisis, P(Crisis).   
                                                 
23Reinhart an Reinhart define a capital flow bonanza as follows They settled on an  algorithm that provided uniform 
treatment across countries but was flexible enough to allow for significant cross-country variation in the current 
account.  As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), we select a threshold to define bonanzas that is common across 
countries (in this case the 20
th percentile).
23  This threshold included most of the better known episodes in the 
literature but was not so inclusive as to label a bonanza more “routine” deteriorations in the current account.  
Because the underlying frequency distributions vary widely across countries, the common threshold produces quite 
disperse country-specific cutoffs.  For instance, in the case of relatively closed India, the cutoff to define a bonanza 
is a current account deficit/GDP in excess of 1.8 percent, while for trade-oriented Malaysia the comparable cutoff is 
a deficit/GDP ratio of 6.6 percent. 
23. 
23   
24 They performed a comparable exercise for currency, debt, and inflation crises.   25
Table 7 reproduces a subset of the results a Reinhart and Reinhart for banking crises. It 
presents aggregates of the country-specific conditional and unconditional probabilities for three 
groups (all countries, high income, and middle and low income). 
The probability of a banking crisis conditional on a capital flow bonanza is higher than the 
unconditional probability. The bottom row of Table 6 provides the share of countries for which 
P(Crisis│Bonanza) ≥ P(Crisis) as an additional indication of how common place is it across 
countries to see bonanzas associated with a more crisis-prone environment.  For banking crises, 
the majority of countries (61 percent) register a higher propensity to banking crises around 
bonanza periods. 
  We conjecture that the 61 percent figure would be higher if one were to include post-
2007 data in Table 7.  Many countries experiencing the most severe banking crises have also run 
large sustained current account deficits. These include many developed countries, such as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, Iceland  and Ireland. 
Table 7. Are Capital Flow Bonanza Episodes More Prone to Banking Crisis? 
1960–2007 
 
Probability of a banking crisis (in percent), 66-country sample 
Conditional on a bonanza  (three-year window)      18.4 
Unconditional     13.2 
Difference 
 
     5.2 
Memorandum item:       
Percent of countries for which conditional probability is greater than 
unconditional 
60.9 
Notes: The three-year window encompasses three years before the bonanza years (see Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008, 
Table 2), the year (or years if these are consecutive) of the bonanza, and the three years following the episode. 
Italics denote significance at the one-percent confidence level. 
Source: Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), based on Tables 2 and 4 and authors’ calculations. 
 
The findings on capital flow bonanzas in Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) are also consistent 
with empirical regularities surrounding credit cycles.  Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who 
examine cycles in credit in both advanced and emerging market economies using a very different   26
approach from that just discussed, find that credit booms in emerging market economies are 
often preceded by surges in capital inflows.  They also conclude that while not all credit booms 
end in financial crises, most emerging market crises were preceded by credit booms.  They link 
credit booms to rising asset prices, an issue we turn to next. 
25   
Equity and housing price cycles and banking crises 
  In this section, we summarize the literature on asset price bubbles and banking crises, 
extending it to incorporate new data on housing prices in emerging markets, as well as data on 
the unfolding crises in the advanced economies.   
The now-infamous real estate bubble in the United States that began to deflate at the end 
of 2005 occupies center stage as a culprit of the present financial crisis.  But the subprime 
episode is far from unique in that regard.  In Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b), we document the 
trajectory in real housing prices around all the post–WWII banking crises in advanced 
economies, with particular emphasis on the “Big 5” crises (Spain, 1977, Norway, 1987, Finland 
and Sweden, 1991 and Japan, 1992).
26  The pattern that emerges is clear: a boom in real housing 
prices in the run-up to the crisis is followed by a marked decline the year of the crisis and in 
subsequent years.  Bordo and Jeanne (2002), also studying the advanced economies during 
1970–2001, find that banking crises tend to occur either at the peak of the boom in real housing 
prices, or right after the bust. Gerdrup (2003) presents a compelling narrative of the links 
between Norway’s three banking crises during 1890s–1993 and the booms and busts in housing 
prices. 
  Table 8 illustrates the magnitude and duration of the downturn in housing prices that has 
historically accompanied major banking crises in both advanced and emerging economies.  
                                                 
25 See also Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), who also examine the growth in real credit to the private sector around 
both banking and currency crises. 
26 The years refer to the beginning of the crisis.   27
While the links between banking crises and the housing price cycle have been examined in both 
our earlier work and numerous other papers (most frequently case studies), this is the first paper 
to provide systematic evidence on the behavior of housing prices for emerging market economies 
around some of their major banking crises.  The crisis episodes include the “Big 6” Asian crises 
of 1997–1998, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and the much buffeted 
Hong Kong.   28
Table 8. Real Housing Price Cycles and Banking Crises 
Country Crisis  date  Peak 
 







Advanced economies: The Big 5 
Finland  1991  1989:Q2 1995:Q4 6  years  –50.4 
Japan  1992  1991:Q1 Ongoing Ongoing –40.2 
Norway  1987  1987:Q2 1993:Q1 5  years  –41.5 
Spain  1977 1978 1982 4  years  –33.3 
Sweden  1991  1990:Q2 1994:Q4 4  years  –31.7 
       
Asian Crisis: The Big 6 
Hong  Kong  1997  1997:Q2 2003:Q2 6  years  –58.9 
Indonesia  1997  1994:Q1 1999:Q1 5  years  –49.9 
Malaysia  1997 1996 1999 3  years  –19.0 
Philippines  1997  1997:Q1 2004:Q3 7  years  –53.0 
South Korea  1997    2001:Q2  4 years  –20.4 
Thailand 1997  1995:Q3 1999:Q4 4  years  –19.9 
      
Other emerging 
Argentina  2001 1999 2003 4  years  –25.5 
Colombia  1998  1997:Q1 2003:Q2 6  years  –51.2 
      
Historical episodes 
Norway  1898 1899 1905 6  years  –25.5 
US  1929 1925 1932 7  years  –12.6 
      
Current cases 
Hungary 2008  2006  Ongoing Ongoing –11.3 
Iceland 2007  November 
2007 
Ongoing Ongoing –9.2 
Ireland  2007  October  2006  Ongoing Ongoing –18.9 
Spain  2007  2007:Q1 Ongoing Ongoing –3.1 





  –16.6 
Sources: Bank of International Settlements and the individual country sources described in the Data Appendix. 
 
Other emerging market episodes include Argentina’s mega-crisis in 2001–2002, and 
Colombia’s 1998 crisis, which produced the worst recession since the national income accounts 
were tabulated in the early 1920s.  In the current conjuncture of unfolding crises, we include   29
Hungary, in addition to the advanced economies that have had recent housing market bubbles 
(Iceland, Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
27 
Two features stand out from the summary statistics presented in Table 8. First is the 
persistence of the cycle in real housing prices in both advanced economies and emerging 
markets, typically four to six years.
28   The second feature that stands out from Table 8 is that the 
magnitudes of the declines in real housing prices around banking crises from peak to trough 
are not appreciably different in emerging and advanced economies.  This comparability is quite 
surprising given that most macroeconomic time series exhibit drastically greater volatility in 
emerging markets, and thus it merits further attention.
29   Certainly, the first results presented 
here on comparing housing price booms and busts around banking crisis dates appears to 
strongly support the contention that banking crises are an equal opportunity menace. 
 
The prolonged housing price downturns following financial crises are in stark contrast to 
the behavior of real equity prices, as illustrated in Figures 5a and 5b in which the pattern of 
decline and recovery is more v-shaped. 
                                                 
27 Historical comparisons are hard to come by, as most real housing price series are of recent vintage.  We do 
include in this category two episodes: the United States during the Great Depression and Norway’s crisis at the turn 
of the century (1898). 
28 See Ceron and Suarez (2006), who estimate its average duration at six years 
29 For example, Agenor, McDermott, and Prasad (2000) provide evidence that output and real consumption are far 
more volatile in emerging markets; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2003) present evidence that the amplitude of the 
cycle in real government spending is orders of magnitude greater in emerging markets.   30
Figure 5a 
 
Real Equity Prices and Banking Crises: 



















Average for banking crises in
advanced economies
Index t-4=100





Notes: The Big 5 crises are: Spain, 1977; Norway, 1987; Finland, 1991, Sweden, 1991; and Japan 1992. 
Source: Global Financial Data and author’s calculations.   31
 
Figure 5b 
Equity Prices and Banking Crises: 

















16 percent and 10 percent declines
The recovery in equities is far swifter than that of the housing market.
t-4 = 100
 
Source: Global Financial Data and author’s calculations.   
Notes: Four of the 40 episodes are pre–World War II (1921–1929).   32
  
  These figures show the evolution of real equity prices from four years prior to the crisis 
to three years afterwards for emerging and advanced economies separately.  As the figures make 
plain, equity prices typically peak before the year of the banking crisis and decline for 2–3 years 
as the crisis approaches and, in the case of emerging markets in the year following the crisis.  
However, the pattern tends to be v-shaped and the recovery complete, in the sense that three 
years after the crisis real equity prices are on average higher than the pre-crisis peak. 
One can conjecture that one reason why major banking crises are such protracted affairs 
is that these episodes involve the real estate market’s persistent cycle in a way that “pure stock 
market crashes” (for instance, Black Monday in October 1987 or the burst of the IT bubble in 
2001) do not. 
30 
  
Financial Sector Expansion and Financial Crisis 
  Philippon (2007) analyzes the expansion of the financial services sector (including 
insurance) in the United States, which averaged 4.9 percent of GDP during 1976–85, rising to 
7.5 percent 1996–2005.  His paper argues that this gain was not sustainable and a decline of at 
least 1 percent of GDP was probable.  In the wake of the subprime crisis, the shrinkage of the 
financial sector during 2008 and 2009 is likely to be significantly larger.  The pre-crisis 
explosion and post-collapse implosion of the financial sector surrounding a banking crisis is also 
not new or unique to the United States. 
Figure 6 plots the number of banks in the United States in the run-up and aftermath of the 
Great Depression.  Perhaps, the bubble in equity and real estate prices also extended to the 
number of financial institutions.  This expansion in the run-up and contraction in the aftermath in 
                                                 
30 This is consistent with the regularity that house prices are far more predictable (i.e., inertial) than equity prices.   33
the number of financial institutions is evident during other banking crises—especially in those 
cases where financial liberalization preceded the banking crisis. 
Figure 6 
 Number of Banks in the US  (1834-1945) and the 

































1925, Peak in real house prices
1929,
Peak in stock 
market
 
Sources: Historical Statistics of the Unites States.   34
IV. The Fiscal and Growth Consequences of Banking Crises 
Looking at the fiscal and growth consequences of banking crises, we again find some 
surprising parallels between developed countries and emerging markets.  Our analysis of the 
fiscal consequences, in particular, is a sharp departure from the previous literature, which has 
focused almost entirely on imputed “bailout costs” to the government which, as we shall argue, 
are extremely difficult to measure.  Instead, we will focus on the fiscal costs to the government, 
particularly the huge build-ups in debt that follow banking crises.  We are able to do so by 
tapping the extensive new cross-country annual dataset on domestic debt compiled in Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008c). This data allow us to show the remarkable surge in debt that occurs in the 
wake of crises.  
That elusive concept of bailout costs 
  As we have noted, much of the literature that studies banking crisis episodes is fixated on 
providing estimates of the fiscal or bailout costs of these crises (see, for example, an excellent 
discussion in Frydl, 1999, and various papers in Norges Bank, 2006).
31  At the time of this 
writing, the International Monetary Fund estimates that the fiscal costs of the U.S. subprime 
crisis will tally about $1.4 trillion, or around 11 percent of GDP.
32  However, estimates of bailout 
costs vary markedly across studies, depending on the methodology and vary even more across 
time, depending on the length of horizon used to calculate the fiscal impact of the crisis, a point 
stressed in Frydl (1999). 
33 Table 9 presents the upper and lower bounds of estimates of the 
bailout costs for some of the better-known banking crises in both advanced and emerging 
economies in nearly all regions.  The discrepancies across estimates are large and, in some cases, 
                                                 
31 See also Caprio et al. (2005), and Hoggarth et al. (2002), and Sanhueza (2001). 
32 See International Monetary Fund, October 2008 World Economic Outlook and Global Financial Stability Report. 
33 A similar problem plagues work on determining the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention by measuring 
the profitability of such market purchases or sales. The results depend importantly on the width of the time window 
and implicit assumptions of the cost of financing. See Neely (1995).   35
staggering.  Among the ”Big 5” post–WWII crises in advanced economies, the differences in 
estimated bailout costs for Japan and Spain are 16 and 11 percent of  GDP, respectively.  Even 
for Norway, where the difference between the upper and lower bounds of the estimates is 2 
percent of GDP, a different way of looking at the discrepancy is to note that the upper end of the 
estimates (4 percent of GDP) is twice as large as the lower bound estimates of the costs of the 
bailout.  Furthermore, as noted in Vale (2006), if the costs are calculated over a longer time 
horizon after the crisis, the picture that emerges is even more at odds with the higher-end 
estimates; it shows that the Norwegian government actually made a small profit on the banking 
resolution, due to the later sale of shares in the nationalized banks. 





Estimated bailout cost as a percent of GDP 
 
  Upper bound  Lower bound  Difference 
Argentina, 1981  55.3  4.0  51.3 
Chile, 1981  41.2  29.0  12.2 
Ghana, 1982   6.0  3.0   3.0 
Japan, 1992  24.0  8.0  16.0 
Norway, 1987   4.0  2.0   2.0 
1 
Philippines 1984  13.2  3.0  10.2 
Spain, 1977  16.8  5.6  11.2 
Sweden, 1991   6.4  3.6  2.8 
US (S&L), 1984   3.2  2.4  0.8 
Sources: Frydl (1999) and sources cited therein and Vale (2006). 
1 In Norges Bank (2006) it is argued that the Norwegian government actually made a small profit on the banking 
resolution. 
 
  In what follows, we argue that this nearly universal focus on providing opaque 
calculations of bailout costs is both misguided and incomplete.  It is misguided because there are 
no widely agreed upon guidelines to calculate these estimates.  It is incomplete because the fiscal 
consequences of banking crises reach far beyond the more immediate bailout costs.  These 
consequences mainly result from the significant adverse impact that the crisis has on government   36
revenues (in nearly all cases) and the fact that in several episodes the fiscal policy reaction to the 
crisis has also involved substantial fiscal stimulus packages.  
Growth in the Aftermath of Crises 
  The fact that most banking crises, especially systemic ones, are associated with economic 
downturns is well established in the empirical literature and we offer no new compelling 
evidence on that score. 
34  Reinhart and Rogoff (2008b) recently summarized the evolution of 
output before, during, and after all the banking crises (systemic or not) in post–WWII.  Figure 7 
shows the advanced economies as a group, as well as the “big five” (Japan, Nordics and Spain), 
while Figure 7b augments this analysis with a comparable summary for the post-war banking 
crises in emerging markets.  As before, time t denotes the year of the crisis.  It is interesting to 
note that the figures show a steeper decline but a somewhat faster comeback in growth for 
emerging markets than in the advanced economies. 
35  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
ascertain the longer run growth consequences of  banking crises, but we wish to note this post-
crises pattern because growth (important in its own right) has nontrivial implications for fiscal 
balances, government debts, and the broader cost and consequences of any  financial crisis. 
                                                 
34 See, for instance, Frydl (1999), and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and especially Rajan, Detragiache and 
Dell’Ariccia (2008), who examine the output consequences of the credit channel following banking crises using 
micro data.  We note that the cases of output collapses studied in Barro and Ursua (2008) virtually all are associated 
with banking crises. 
35 It is important to note that the v-shaped pattern of recovery is importantly influenced by the sharp comebacks of 
the Asian economies from the severe 1997–1998 crisis.  Excluding these countries considerably worsens the average 
performance two and three years after the banking crisis, making the pattern look more u-shaped.   37
Figure7a
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advanced economies
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Sources: Maddison (2003), Total Economy Database (2008), IMF World Economic Outlook (2008), and author’s 
calculations. 
Notes: Banking crisis episodes are listed in Appendix II.   38
 
Figure 7b 
Average GDP change before and after banking crises: 
developing countries
Blue-colored bars exclude Taiwan, Thailand and Singapore; Bars on the right include



































Sources: Maddison (2004), Total Economy Database (2008), IMF World Economic Outlook (2008), and author’s 
calculations. 
Notes: Banking Crisis episodes are listed in Appendix II.   39
Beyond Bailout Costs: The Impact Of The Crisis On Revenues And Debt 
  Since WWII the most common policy response to a systemic banking crisis (in  both 
emerging and advanced economies) has been to engineer (with varying degrees of success) a 
bailout of the banking sector, whether through purchases of bad assets, directed mergers of bad 
banks with relatively sound institutions, direct government takeovers, or some combination of 
these.  Such actions have had in many cases major fiscal consequences, typically early on in the 
crisis.  However, as noted earlier, banking crises are protracted affairs with lingering 
consequences in asset markets—notably real estate prices and the real economy.  As such it is 
not surprising that government revenues are adversely and significantly impacted by the crisis.   
As noted, several studies have traced out the adverse impacts of banking crises on 
economic activity; what these studies have left unexplored is the direct consequences of the 
recession on government finances—specifically, tax revenues.  Figure 8a plots the average 
pattern in annual real revenue growth three years before, during, and three years after banking 
crises for a total of 86 banking crises during 1800–1944 for which we have complete revenue 
data. 
36   
The comparable exercise is shown for all 138 post–WWII banking crises in  
Figure 8b.  The patterns for the pre- and post-war samples are not identical but strikingly similar.  
Annual revenue growth is robust in the years leading up to the banking crisis; growth weakens 
significantly the year of the crisis and subsequently posts declines in the years immediately 
following the onset of the crisis.  For the pre-war episodes revenues decline, on average for two 
years, while for the post-war the revenue slump extends to the third year.   
 
                                                 
36 Revenues (from Mitchell, 2003a, b, and c ) are deflated by consumer price indices; the numerous sources for these 
data are given on a country-by-country and period-by-period basis in the data appendix to Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a).   40
Figure 8a (all countries) 





















The toll on revenue from the crises are not new...
 
 
Sources:  Revenues are from Mitchell (2003a, b, ). For the numerous country-specific sources of prices see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008a). 
Notes: Central government revenues deflated by consumer prices.  There are a total of 86 banking crisis episodes 
during 1800–1940 for which we have revenue data.   41
 
Figure 8b (all countries) 
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Bail-out costs are only part of the story why public debt surges 
after the crisis
 
Sources:  Revenues are taken from Mitchell (2003a, b). For the numerous country-specific sources of prices see 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
Notes: Central government revenues deflated by consumer prices.  There are a total of 138 banking crises  during 
1945–2008 for which we have revenue data. 
 
 
Parallels in Revenue Losses between Emerging Markets and Developed Economies 
 
 
Again, the parallels between developed countries and emerging markets is striking. 
Figure 8c shows the revenue declines surrounding banking crises for the advanced countries 
across the entire sample, with the “big five” post-war crises also listed separately.  Revenue 
growth resumes (from a lower base) starting in the third year after the crisis. Advanced 
economies exhibit a strong inclination to resort to stimulus measures to cushion economic 
activity, seen most spectacularly in the aggressive use of infrastructure spending in Japan during 
the 1990s.  Emerging markets are far less well poised to engage in countercyclical fiscal policy.    42
Nevertheless, the effect of the crisis on the trajectory of taxes is broadly similar.  Figure 8d gives 
revenue declines around banking crises for emerging markets for the entire sample.  The average 
revenue drop is actually quite similar to the “big five,” although the recovery is faster—in line 
with a more swift recovery in growth, as discussed in the preceding section. 
 
Figure 8c 





















Sources:  Revenues are taken from Mitchell (2003a, b, ). For the numerous country-specific sources of prices see 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a). 
Notes: Central government revenues deflated by consumer prices.   43
Figure 8d 



















The toll on revenue adds to the debt...
 
 
Sources:  Revenues are from Mitchell (2003a, b). For the numerous country-specific sources of prices see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008a). 
Notes: Central government revenues deflated by consumer prices.   
 
 
Government debt buildup in the aftermath of banking crises  
To get a rough approximation of the impact of a crisis on government finances, we use 
the historical central government debt data compiled in Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c).  It is 
important to note that this is a partial picture, since the general (not just central government) is 
affected by the crisis.  Also, there is typically during these episodes a marked expansion in 
government-guaranteed debt, which does not show up in the central government figures.   44
With these caveats in mind, Figure 9 presents a summary of the evolution of debt in the 
aftermath of some of the major post-war crises in both advanced and emerging markets.   
Figure 9 
Cumulative increase in public debt in the three years following 
the banking crisis















Index=100 in year of crisis
Average is 186.3
 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008c). 
Not surprisingly, taken together, the bailout of the banking sector, the shortfall in 
revenue, and the fiscal stimulus packages that have accompanied some of these crises imply 
widening fiscal deficits adding to the existing stock of government debt.  What is perhaps 
surprising is how dramatic the rise in debt is.    If the stock of debt is indexed to equal 100 at the 
time of the crisis (T), the average experience is one in which the real stock of debt rises to 186 
three years after the crisis.  That is to say, the real stock of debt nearly doubles.
37  Such 
increases in government indebtedness are evident in emerging and advanced economies alike, 
                                                 
37 Indeed, there are some important cases such as Japan where the accelerated debt build-up goes on for over a 
decade, so the three-year cutoff grossly understates the longer term consequences.   45
and extremely high in both.  Arguably, the true legacy of banking crises is higher public 
indebtedness—far over and beyond the direct headline costs of big bailout packages.
38  
(Obviously, as we noted earlier, the rise in public debt depends on a whole range of political and 
economic factors, including the effectiveness of the policy response and the severity of the initial 
real economic shock that produced the crisis. Nevertheless, the universality of the large debt rise 
is stunning.) 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
Countries may “graduate” from serial default on sovereign debt and recurrent episodes of 
very high inflation, as the cases of France, Austria, Spain and others illustrate.  History tells us, 
however, that graduation from recurrent banking and financial crises is much more elusive.  And 
it should not have taken the 2007–2009 financial crisis to remind us.  Out of the 66 countries in 
our sample, only Portugal, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium had managed to escape from 
banking crises from 1945–2007.  During 2008, however, even three of these four countries were 
among those engaged in massive bailouts as the current global financial crisis evolves. 
Indeed, the wave of financial crises that began with the onset of the subprime crisis in the 
United States in 2007 has dispelled any prior notion among academics, market participants, or 
policymakers that acute financial crises are either a thing of the past or relegated to the “volatile” 
emerging markets. The “this time is different syndrome” has been alive and well in the United 
States, where it first took the form of a widespread belief that sharp productivity gains stemming 
from the information technology industry justified price–earning ratios in the equity market that 
                                                 
38 We note that Figure 9 gives percentage change in debt, rather than debt to GDP, in order not to distort numbers by 
the large falls in GDP that sometimes accompany crises.  However, the same basic message comes across looking at 
debt to GDP instead.  Note that the calculations are based on total central government debt.   46
far exceeded any historical norm. 
39 That delusion ended with the burst of the IT bubble in 2001.  
But the excesses quickly reemerged, morphing into a different shape in a different market.  The 
securitization of subprime mortgages combined with a heavy appetite for these instruments from 
countries like Germany, Japan, and major emerging markets like China fueled perceptions that 
housing prices would continue to climb forever.  “This time it was different” because there were 
new markets, new instruments, and new lenders.  In particular, financial engineering was thought 
to have tamed risk by better tailoring exposures to investors’ appetites.  Derivatives contracts, 
meanwhile, offered all manner of hedging opportunities. We now know how that popular 
delusion ended. 
Historical experience already shows that rich countries are not as “special” as some 
cheerleaders had been arguing, both when it comes to managing capital inflows and especially 
when it comes to banking crises.  This paper has used an extensive new dataset that includes data 
on housing prices in some key emerging markets as well as revenue and domestic debt data that 
dates back almost a century for most countries and more for many.  Surprisingly, not only is the 
frequency and duration of banking crises similar across developed countries and middle-income 
countries, so too are quantitative measures of both the run-up and the fall-out.  Notably, the 
duration of real housing price declines following financial crises in both groups are often four 
years or more, while the magnitudes of the crash are comparable. One striking finding is the 
huge surge in debt most countries experience in the wake of a financial crisis, with real central 
government debt typically increasing by about 86 percent on average (in real terms) during the 
three years following the crisis.  
                                                 
39 An important question is how rare banking crises, through sudden changes in market liquidity, might amplify the 
effects on asset prices analyzed by Barro (2009).   47
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Appendix  I.  Country sample, crisis definition and dates 
 
In this section, we list the countries in the core sample (Table A1), and describe the 
criteria used in this study to date banking crises. 
   With regard to banking crises, our analysis stresses events.  The main reason for 
following this approach has to do with the lack of long time-series data that would allow us to 
date banking or financial crises quantitatively along the lines of inflation or currency crashes.  
For example, the relative price of bank stocks (or financial institutions relative to the market) 
would be a logical indicator to examine.  However, this is problematic, particularly for the earlier 
part of our sample as well as for developing countries (where many domestic banks do not have 
publicly traded equity). 
 If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by bank runs and withdrawals, then 
changes in bank deposits could be used to date the crises.  This indicator would have certainly 
done well in dating the numerous banking panics of the 1800s.  Often, however, the banking 
problems do not arise from the liability side, but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, 
be it from a collapse in real estate prices or increased bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector.  In 
this case, a large increase in bankruptcies or nonperforming loans could be used to mark the 
onset of the crisis.  Indicators of business failures and nonperforming loans are also usually 
available only sporadically, if at all; the latter are also made less informative by the banks’ desire 
to hide their problems for as long as possible.   54
Table A1. Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
Country (An asterisk 
denotes no sovereign 
default or rescheduling 
history) 
 
Year of Independence 
if after 1800 
 
 
Share of World Real GDP 
1990 International Geary–Khamis US dollars 
   1913  1990 
Africa     
Algeria 1962  0.23  0.27 
Angola 1975  0.00  0.03 
Central Africa Republic  1960  0.00  0.01 
Côte D’Ivoire  1960  0.00  0.06 
Egypt 1831  0.40  0.53 
Kenya 1963  0.00  0.10 
Mauritius *  1968  0.00  0.03 
Morocco 1956  0.13  0.24 
Nigeria 1960  0.00  0.40 
South Africa  1910  0.36  0.54 
Tunisia 1957  0.06  0.10 
Zambia 1964  0.00  0.02 
Zimbabwe 1965  0.00  0.05 
Asia     
China   8.80  7.70 
Hong Kong *       
India 1947 7.47  4.05 
Indonesia 1949  1.65  1.66 
Japan   2.62  8.57 
Korea *  1945  0.34  1.38 
Malaysia *  1957  0.10  0.33 
Myanmar 1948  0.31  0.11 
Philippines 1947  0.34  0.53 
Singapore *  1965  0.02  0.16 
Taiwan *  1949  0.09  0.74 
Thailand *    0.27  0.94 
Europe     
Austria   0.86  0.48 
Belgium *  1830  1.18  0.63 
Denmark *    0.43  0.35 
Finland *  1917  0.23  0.31 
France   5.29  3.79 
Germany   8.68 4.67 
Greece 1829  0.32  0.37 
Hungary 1918  0.60  0.25 
Italy  3.49  3.42 
Netherlands *    0.91  0.95 
Norway *  1905  0.22  0.29 
Poland 1918  1.70  0.72 
Portugal   0.27 0.40 
Romania 1878  0.80  0.30 
Russia   8.50  4.25 
Spain     1.52  1.75 
Sweden     0.64  0.56 
Turkey     0.67  1.13 
United Kingdom *    8.22  3.49 
Sources:  Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2004).   
Notes: An asterisk denotes no sovereign external default or rescheduling history.    55
Table A1 (concluded) Countries, Regions, and World GDP 
 
Year of Independence                     Share of World Real GDP   
       if after 1800           1990 International Geary–Khamis US dollars 
   1913  1990 
Latin America    
Argentina 1816  1.06  0.78 
Bolivia 1825  0.00  0.05 
Brazil 1822  0.70  2.74 
Chile 1818 0.38  0.31 
Colombia 1819  0.23  0.59 
Costa Rica  1821  0.00  0.05 
Dominican Republic  1845  0.00  0.06 
Ecuador 1830  0.00  0.15 
El Salvador  1821  0.00  0.04 
Guatemala 1821  0.00  0.11 
Honduras 1821  0.00  0.03 
Mexico 1821  0.95  1.91 
Nicaragua 1821  0.00  0.02 
Panama 1903  0.00  0.04 
Paraguay 1811  0.00  0.05 
Peru 1821 0.16 0.24 
Uruguay 1811  0.14  0.07 
Venezuela 1830  0.12  0.59 
North America     
Canada *  1867  1.28  1.94 
United States *    18.93  21.41 
Oceania     
Australia *  1901  0.91  1.07 
New Zealand *  1907  0.21  0.17 
Total Sample-66 countries    
93.04    89.24 
  
Sources: Correlates of War (2007), Maddison (2004).  
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Given these data limitations, we mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (1) bank runs that 
lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions 
(as in Venezuela in 1993 or Argentina in 2001); and (2) if there are no runs, the closure, 
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or 
group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial 
institutions (as in Thailand 1996–97).  We rely on existing studies of banking crises and on the 
financial press; according to these studies the fragility of the banking sector was widespread 
during these periods.  
Many country-specific studies (such as Camprubi, 1957, for Peru; Cheng, 2003, 
McElderry, 1976, for China; and Noel, 2002, for Mexico) pick up banking crisis episodes not 
covered by the multicountry literature and contribute importantly to this chronology, but the 
main sources for cross-country dating of crises are as follows:  For post-1970, the comprehensive 
and well-known study by Caprio and Klingebiel—which the authors updated through 2003—is 
authoritative, especially when it comes to classifying banking crises into systemic or more 
benign categories; Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Jácome (2008) for Latin America round 
out the sources.  For pre–World War II, Kindleberger (1989), Bordo et al. (2001), and Willis and 
Beckhart (1929) provide multicountry coverage on banking crises.   
We relegate a summary discussion of the limitations of this event-based dating approach 
to Table A2, while the years in which the banking crises began are listed in Table A3—
unfortunately, for many of the early episodes it is difficult to ascertain how long the crisis lasted.    57
Table A2. Defining Banking Crises by Events:  A Summary 
 
Type of Crisis 
 












We mark a banking crisis by two types 
of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the 
closure, merging, or takeover by the 
public sector of one or more financial 
institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, 
the closure, merging, takeover, or 
large-scale government assistance of an 
important financial institution (or group 
of institutions) that marks the start of a 
string of similar outcomes for other 
financial institutions.   
This approach to dating the beginning of a 
banking crisis is not without drawbacks.  It 
could date a crisis too late, because the 
financial problems usually begin well before 
a bank is finally closed or merged; it could 
also date a crisis too early, because the worst 
part of a crisis may come later.  Unlike the 
external debt crises (see below), which have 
well-defined closure dates, it is often difficult 
or impossible to accurately pinpoint the year 
in which a crisis ended. 
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Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007   
High-Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: Low-Moderate, 1800-1879 
France  1802       
France  1805       
UK  1810       
UK  1815       
Denmark  1813       
US  1818       
UK,  US  1825       
US  1836       
Canada,  UK  1837       
UK  1847       
Belgium  1848       
UK,  US  1857    India 1863 
Italy,  UK  1866       
Austria,  US  1873 Peru  1873    
   South  Africa  1877    
 
Capital Mobility: High, 1880-1914 
Germany  1880      
France    1882 Mexico  1883    
US 1884         
Denmark 1885         
Italy 1887         






1890    
Germany, 
Italy, Portugal 
1891        
Australia 1893         
Netherlands, 
Sweden 
1897        
Norway  1898 Chile  1899    
Finland  1900 Brazil  1900    
Germany, 
Japan 





1907 Mexico  1907    
  Chile 1908    









1914    
Capital Mobility: Low, 1915-1919 
  Chile*  1915      59
 
Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007 (continued) 
High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: Moderate, 1920–1929 




1921     India  1921 
Canada, Japan, 
Taiwan 
1923 China  1923    
Austria  1924       
Belgium,* 
Germany* 
1925 Brazil,  Chile*  1926    
Japan,  Taiwan  1927       
US* 1929  Brazil, 
Mexico* 
1929 India  1929 
 
Capital Mobility: Low, 1930–1969 










1931    
Belgium* 1934  Argentina, 
China 
1934    
Italy  1935 Brazil  1937    
Belgium,* 
Finland 
1939        
      India 1947* 
  Brazil  1963     
 
Capital Mobility: Moderate, 1970–1979 
  Uruguay  1971     




Israel, Spain  
1977 South  Africa  1977    
  Venezuela  1978    
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Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007 (continued) 
High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
Capital Mobility: High, 1980-2007 




1980    
   Mexico,  
Philippines 
Uruguay 
1981    
Hong Kong, 
Singapore 
1982  Colombia, 
Turkey 






1983  Morocco, 
Peru, 
Thailand 
1983  Equatorial 
Guinea, Niger 
1983 
UK, US  1984      Mauritania  1984 
   Argentina* 
Brazil,* 
Malaysia* 
1985  Guinea, Kenya  1985 













   Lebanon, 
Panama 






Nepal,  Senegal 
1988 




1989    
Italy 1990  Algeria, 
Brazil*, Egypt, 
Romania 


























  Cape Verde, 
Venezuela 
1993  Guinea, 
Eritrea, India, 
Kyrgyz 
Republic,   
Togo 
1993 
   61
 
Table A3. Banking Crises Dates and Capital Mobility: 1800–2007 (continued) 
High Income  Middle Income  Low Income 
Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear  Country (ies)  BeginningYear 
 
Capital Mobility: High, 1980–2007 











































1998    
   Bolivia, 
Honduras, Peru 
1999    
   Nicaragua  2000    
   Argentina* 
Guatemala 
2001    
   Paraguay 
Uruguay 
2002    
   Dominican 
Republic 
2003    
   Guatemala  2006    
US,  UK  2007       
 
Note: An asterisk (*) denotes that the episode in question was associated with an output collapse as defined in Barro 
and Ursua (2008). However, many of the countries in our extended sample are not covered in Barro and Ursua 
(2008).  
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Table A4. Real House Prices 
Country 
 
Period covered  Source  Commentary 
Argentina  1981–2007  Reporte Immobiliario  Average value of old 
apartments, Buenos 
Aires 
Colombia  1997:Q1–2007:Q4 Departamento 
Administrativo Nacional 
de Estadistica 
New housing price 
index, total 23 
municipalities 
Finland  1983:Q1–2008:Q1  Stat-Fin Online Service  Dwellings in old blocks 
of flats, Finland 
  1970–2007 Bank  of  International 
Settlements 
House price index, 
Finland 
Hong Kong  1991:7–2008:2  Hong Kong  University  Real estate index series, 
Hong Kong 
     
Hungary  2000–2007  Otthon Centrum  Average price of old 
condominiums, 
Budapest 
Iceland  2000:3–2008:4  Statistics Iceland  House price index, 
Iceland 
Indonesia  1994:Q1–2008:Q1  Bank of Indonesia  Residential property 
price index, new houses, 
new developments, big 
cities 
Ireland  1996:Q1–2008:Q1 ESRI/Permanent  TSB  House  prices, 
standardized, Ireland 
Japan  1955:H1–2007:H2  Japan Real Estate 
Institute 
Land prices, urban, 
residential index, 
Japan 
Malaysia  2000:Q1–2007:Q4  Bank Negara  House price index, 
Malaysia 
Norway  1970–2007 Bank  of  International 
Settlements 
House price index, all 
dwellings, Norway 
  1819–2007  Norges Bank  Housing prices, Norway 






South Korea  1986:1–2006:12  Kookmin Bank  Housing price index 
  2007:Q1–2008:Q1  Kookmin Bank  Housing price index 
Spain  1990:Q1–2008:Q1  Banco de España  House price index, 
appraised housing, 
Spain 
  1970–2007 Bank  of  International 
Settlements 
House price index, 
appraised housing, 
Spain 
     
Thailand  1991:Q1–2007:Q  Bank of Thailand  House price index, 
single detached house 
United Kingdom  1952:1–2008:4  Nationwide  Average house price UK 
  1970–2007 Bank  of  International 
Settlements 
House price index, UK 
United States  1890–2007 
1987:Q1–2008:Q2 
Standard and Poors  Case–Shiller national 
price index, US Country Brief Summary Year Source
Albania
After the July 1992 cleanup, 31% of "new" banking system loans were 
nonperforming. Some banks faced liquidity problems due to a logjam of 
interbank liabilities.
1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Algeria
Circulation limits led to suspended specie payments. Lack of mortgage 
banking institutes led bank to secure loans based on real estate—many were 
foreclosed to escape loss. 
August 1870
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a);  Conant (1915) 
Algeria Share of nonperforming loans in the banking system reached 50%. 1990–1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Angola Two state-owned commercial banks had insolvency problems. 1991–1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Argentina
Suspension of National Bank of the Argentine Republic; high foreign debt, 
domestic credit, and imports led to reserve losses; peso fell 27% but the 
crisis was brief and had relatively little impact on industrial production. 
January, 1885
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
 
Banks made extensive loans, and real estate prices rose dramatically with 
excess bank note issue. Land prices fell by 50%, and Bank of the Nation 
could not pay its dividend, leading to a run, and the peso fell 36% both 
years. In July 1890, every bank of issue was suspended—sent gold up 320%. 
In December 1890, the Bank of Argentine Nation replaced the old Bank of 
the Nation. 
July 1890–1891
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
 
Bad harvests and European demands for liquidity due to the War led to bank 
runs, with private banks losing 45% of deposits in two years.
1914
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915); 
Nakamura and Zarazaga 
(2001)
  End of gold standard with insolvent loans building.  1931
Bordo et al. (2001); della 
Paolera and Taylor 
(1999)
 
Huge loans to government and nonperforming assets building for many 
years; finally all taken over by the new Central Bank.
1934
Bordo et al. (2001); della 
Paolera and Taylor 
(1999)
 
The failure of a large private bank (Banco de Intercambio Regional) led to 
runs on three other banks. Eventually more than 70 institutions—16% of 
commercial bank assets and 35% of finance company assets—were 
liquidated or subjected to central bank intervention.
March, 
1980–1982
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001) 
 
In early May, the government closed a large bank, leading to large runs, 
which led the government to freeze dollar deposits on May 19.
May, 1985
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
 
Nonperforming assets accounted for 27% of aggregate portfolio and 37% of 
state banks' portfolios. Failed banks held 40% of financial system assets. 
1989–1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
The Mexican devaluation led to a run on banks, which resulted in an 18% 
decline in deposits between December and March. Eight banks suspended 
and three banks collapsed. Through end of 1997, 63 of 205 banking 
institutions were closed or merged.
December, 
1994–1996
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
 
In March 2001, a bank run started due to lack of public confidence in 
government policy actions. In late November 2001, many banks were on the 
verge of collapsing and partial withdrawal restrictions were imposed 
(corralito) and fixed-term deposits (CDs) were reprogrammed to stop 
outflows from banks (corralon). In December 2002, the corralito was lifted. 
In January 2003, one bank was closed, three banks were nationalized, and 
many others were reduced in size. 
March, 2001
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Jácome (2008)
Armenia
The Central Bank closed half the active banks; large banks continued to 




Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Table A5. Banking Crises:  Historical Summaries
Table A5 - 1Country Brief Summary Year Source
Australia
Domestic lending boom showed the deteriorated quality of bank assets; land 
boom and unregulated banking system led to speculation. Closure of 
Mercantile Bank in Australia and Federal Bank of Australia meant British 
deposits ran off. Bank share prices fell heavily, banks retrenched and 
stopped long-term loans, and many closed. The depression of the 1890s 
followed. 
January, 1893
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
  Two large banks received capital from government to cover losses. 1989–1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); 
Austria
Speculation in economy; Vienna Stock Exchange crash led 52 banks and 44 
provincial banks to fail. 
May, 1873–1874 Conant (1915) 
Austria Difficulties in major bank; liquidation began in June. May, 1923
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Austria Second largest bank failed and merged with major bank. November, 1929
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Austria Failure of Creditanstalt and run of foreign depositors. May, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Azerbaijan
Twelve private banks closed; three large state-owned banks deemed 
insolvent and one faced serious liquidity problems.
1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Bangladesh
Four banks, accounting for 70% of credit, had 20% nonperforming loans. 
From the late 1980s, the entire private and public banking system was 
technically insolvent.
1987–1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Belarus
Many banks undercapitalized; forced mergers burdened some banks with 
poor loan portfolios.
1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Belgium
Two rival banks: Bank of Belgium (created in 1835) and Société Générale. 
Fear of war led to credit contraction. Société tried to bankrupt the Bank of 
Belgium by redeeming large amounts of credit, weakening both. Runs on 






Bank of Belgium resigned its function of State depository to Société 
Générale; Société felt impact of crisis—abandoned all branches except 
Antwerp.
1842 Conant (1915) 
 
Société Générale suspended payments and lost right of issue after 
government demands for reform. National Bank of Belgium created.
February, 1848 Conant (1915) 
 
Public fear due to State decisions and burdens; but Bank of Belgium 
reassured people by continuing payments (raised discount rate and placed 
restrictions on acceptance of commercial paper)—great cost to commerce 
and bank.
July, 1870–1871 Conant (1915) 
 
Worldwide investors dumped assets and withdrew liquidity, pushing prices 
down and threatening financial institutions with failure. Stock exchanges 
around the world collapsed. 
1914 Bordo et al. (2001)
  Consequence of systemic deflation led to a funding crisis. 1925–1926
Bordo et al. (2001); 
Johnson (1998)
 
Rumors about imminent failure of Bank of Bruselles, the largest bank, led to 
withdrawals from all banks. Later, expectations of devaluations led to 
withdrawals of foreign deposits.
May, 1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
 
Failure of Banque Belge de Travail developed into general banking and 
exchange crisis.
1934
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
  1939 Bordo et al. (2001)
Benin
All three commercial banks collapsed and 80% of banks' loan portfolios 
were nonperforming.
1988–1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Bolivia
In October 1987, the central bank liquidated two of twelve state commercial 
banks; seven more reported large losses. In total, five banks were liquidated. 




Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003)
Table A5 - 2Country Brief Summary Year Source
 
Two banks, with 11% of banking system assets, closed in 1994. In 1995, 
four of 15 domestic banks, with 30% of banking system assets, experienced 
liquidity problems and suffered a high level of nonperforming loans. 
1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 





Banking system suffered from a high level of nonperforming loans due to 
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the civil war. 
1992–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Botswana Banks merged, liquidated, or recapitalized. 1994–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Brazil
Large government borrowing and currency speculation—the government 
continually issued more notes. National Bank of Brazil and Bank of US of 
Brazil merged into Bank of Republic of US of Brazil. The new bank retired 




Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
 
Civil War and currency depreciation. A loan from Rothschild's in London 
helped with an agreement on settling the loan. 
1897–1898
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
 
Inelastic coffee exports could not respond to currency depreciation; 
concentrated industry, limited competition, and slowed recovery from 
deflation. Liquidity injection did not help—deposits ran off and loans 
recalled. 
1900–1901
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
  1914 Bordo et al. (2001)
  1923 Bordo et al. (2001)
1926
1929
  1963 Bordo et al. (2001)
 
Three large banks (Comind, Maison Nave, and Auxiliar) were taken over by 
the government.
November, 1985
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
  Deposits converted to bonds. 1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
In 1994, 17 small banks were liquidated, three private banks were 
intervened, and eight state banks placed under administration. The Central 
Bank intervened in or put under temporary administration 43 financial 
institutions, and banking system nonperforming loans reached 15% by the 
end of 1997. Private banks returned to profitability in 1998, but public banks 
did not begin to recover until 1999. 
July, 1994–1996
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Brunei Several financial firms and banks failed. 1986
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Bulgaria
In 1995, about 75% of banking system loans were substandard. Banking 
system run in early 1996. The government stopped providing bailouts, 
prompting the closure of 19 banks accounting for 1/3 of sector assets. 
Surviving banks were recapitalized by 1997.
1995–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Burkina Faso Banking system nonperforming loans estimated at 34%. 1988–1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Burundi
Banking system nonperforming loans estimated at 25% in 1995 and one 
bank was liquidated.
1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Cameroon
In 1989, banking system nonperforming loans reached 60–70%. Five 
commercial banks were closed and three restructured.
1987–1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 
At the end of 1996, nonperforming loans were 30% of total loans. Two 
banks were closed and three restructured.
1995–1998
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Canada
Bank of Upper Canada and Gore Bank suspended specie payments; rebellion 





Bank in Western Canada suspended payments, leading to financial panic. 
Bank of Upper Canada failed; rapid growth in Ontario—lost capital in land 
speculation in 1857; abandoned safe banking practices and made loans to 
lawyers, politicians, and gentry. 
September, 1866 Conant (1915) 
Table A5 - 3Country Brief Summary Year Source
  Several bank failures; depression from 1874–1879. September, 1873 Conant (1915) 
 
Ontario Bank failed due to speculation in NY stock market; shareholders 
lose entire investments.
October, 1906 Conant (1915) 
 
Current account deficit and a crop failure meant eastern banks were 
unwilling to ship funds west; banks raised loan rates, cut lending, and 
limited credit to farmers. Short but sharp recession; Canadian banks 
borrowed dominion notes and banks increased note issue. 
January, 1908
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
  Royal Bank acquired Bank of British Honduras and Bank of British Guiana. 1912 Conant (1915) 
  Home Bank of Canada, with over 70 branches, failed due to bad loans. 1923
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Kryzanowski and Roberts 
(1999)
 
Fifteen members of the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, including 
two banks, failed.
1983–1985
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Cape Verde At the end of 1995, commercial banks' nonperforming loans reached 30%. 1993




Four banks were liquidated. 1976–1982
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 
The two largest banks, with 90% of assets, were restructured. Banking 
system nonperforming loans reached 40%.
1988–1999
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Chad Banking sector experienced solvency problems. 1980s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Chad Private sector nonperforming loans reached 35%. 1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 
Bank currency system and gold standard completely wrecked by threat of 
war with Argentine Republic. On July 5th, growing exports of gold and 
Bank of Chile’s refusal to honor gold drafts led to a run on banks at Santiago 
and general suspicion of gold drafts. The government issued irredeemable 
paper money, constantly increasing the monetary supply for the next 10 
years, leading to a period of inflation and overspeculation.
July, 1898
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
 
Four years of inflationary measures following a stock market crash; the peso 
fell 30% during the crisis, and the government loaned treasury notes to 
banks to prevent a financial sector crisis. Data concerning the ensuing 
recession are unavailable. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
  1914 Bordo et al. (2001)
  1925 Bordo et al. (2001)
  Entire mortgage system insolvent. 1976
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
Three banks began to lose deposits; interventions began two months later. 
Interventions occurred in four banks and four nonbank financial institutions, 
accounting for 33% of outstanding loans. In 1983, there were seven more 
bank interventions and one financiera, accounting for 45% of financial 
system assets. By the end of 1983, 19% of loans were nonperforming.
September, 
1981–1985
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
China
Failure of a major silk-trading company in Shanghai led to the bankruptcies 
of many local banks.
1883 Cheng (2003)
China Postwar depression led many banks to fail. 1923–1925 Young 1971
Shanghai closed all Chinese banks for the duration of the war. 1931 Cheng (2003)
Flight of silver led to huge economic downturn and financial crisis; the two 
major banks came under government control and were reorganized. 
1934–1937 Cheng (2003)
China's four large state-owned commercial banks, with 68% of banking 
system assets, were deemed insolvent. Banking system nonperforming loans 
were estimated at 50%.
1997–1999
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Table A5 - 4Country Brief Summary Year Source
Colombia
Banco Nacional became the first of six major banks and eight financial 
companies to be intervened, accounting for 25% of banking system assets.
July, 1982–1987
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
 
Many banks and financial institutions failed; capitalization ratios and 
liquidity decreased dramatically, and total assets of the financial industry 
contracted by over 20%.
April, 1998




Banking sector experienced solvency problems. 1980s




Four state-owned banks were insolvent; a fifth was recapitalized with private 
participation.
1991–1992




Nonperforming loans reached 75%. Two state-owned banks liquidated and 
two privatized. In 1997, 12 banks had serious financial difficulties.
1994–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Congo, Republic of
Crisis began in 1992.  In 2001–2002, two large banks were restructured and 
privatized. Remaining insolvent bank being liquidated.
1992–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Costa Rica
In 1987, public banks accounting for 90% of banking system loans were in 
financial distress, with 32% of loans considered uncollectable.
1987
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
The third largest bank, Banco Anglo Costarricense, a state-owned institution 
with 17% of deposits was closed.
1994–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); Jácome (2008)
Cote D'Ivoire
Four large banks (90% of banking system loans) were affected; three or four 
insolvent, six government banks closed. 
1988–1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Croatia
Five banks, accounting for about half of banking system loans, were deemed 
insolvement and taken over by the Bank Rehabilitation Agency.
1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Czechoslovakia
Withdrawal of foreign deposits sparked domestic withdrawals but no general 
banking panic.
July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Czech Republic
Several bank closings since 1993. In 1994–1995, 38% of banking system 
loans were nonperforming.
1991–?




Government declared it could not redeem Deposit Bank’s Courant notes at 
original value—form of bankruptcy which diminished its public debt 
because notes were held by the people. New Royal Bank established; 
Courantbank, Specie Bank, and Deposit Bank abolished. 
January, 1813 Conant (1915) 
Financial crisis led the National bank to assume central bank responsibilities 
through the 1860s.  
1857
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
 
Industrial Bank diverted half its capital stock to cover losses; two provincial 
banks failed—led to lull in banking business.
1877
Conant (1915); Jonung 
and Hagberg (2002)
National Bank intervened to provide support for commercial and savings 
banks.
1885
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
 
Important bank failure led to suspension of Freeholders’ Bank and bank run 
on other institutions. The National Bank helped alleviate panic—took on 
five remaining banks and suspended banks’ liabilities. 
February, 1902 Conant (1915) 
 
Turbulence in the world markets and Germany and nonperforming assets led 
to decreased confidence. Consortium of five leading banks assisted and 
guaranteed the liabilities of weak banks, leading to a quick recovery. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915); 
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
  1914 Bordo et al. (2001)
 
Banking crises lasted for many years due to reckless lending during the war 
and the international downswing in prices in the early 1920s.
1921
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
  1931 Bordo et al. (2001)
 
Two small banks collapsed and shook the banking system leading to moves 
to curb bank lending. Cumulative losses over 1990–92 were 9% of loans; 40 
of 60 problem banks were merged. 
March, 
1987–1992
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Table A5 - 5Country Brief Summary Year Source
Deep Faroese crisis. 1992
Djibouti
Two of six commercial banks ceased operations and other banks 
experienced difficulties.
1991–1993




The third largest bank, with a market share of 7% of assets, was intervened. 1996 Jácome (2008)
 
The 2003 banking crisis started with the intervention of the third largest 
bank—with a market share of 10%. Deposit withdrawals had already started 
by mid-2002, following allegations of fraud resulting from the discovery of 
hidden liabilities recorded in a “parallel bank.” Immediately after, the crisis 
extended to two other institutions—with an additional 10% of market 
share—featuring similar inappropriate accounting practices. 
2003 Jácome (2008)
Ecuador
Program exchanging domestic for foreign debt implemented to bail out 
banking system. 
1981
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
A medium-sized bank, Banco de los Andes, with a market share of 6% of 
deposits, was intervened and then purchased by another private bank.
1994 Jácome (2008)
 
Authorities intervened in several small financial institutions; by the end of 
1995, 30 financial societies (sociedades financieras) and seven banks were 
receiving extensive liquidity support. In early 1996, the fifth largest 
commercial bank was intervened. 
Late 1995–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
 
60% of the banking system was intervened, taken over, or closed. Seven 
financial institutions, accounting for 25–30% of commercial banking assets, 
were closed in 1998–99. In March 1999, bank deposits were frozen for six 
months. By January 2000, 16 financial institutions, accounting for 65% of 
the assets, had either been closed (12) or taken over (four) by the 
governments. All deposits were unfrozen by March 2000.
April, 1998–1999
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Jácome (2008)
Egypt Crisis due to credit abuse and issue of new securities. March, 1907 Conant (1915) 
Egypt Run on Cairo and Alexandria branches of German banks. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
  The government closed several large investment companies.
January, 
1980–1981
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
  Four public banks were given capital assistance.
January, 
1990–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Reinhart (2002); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
El Salvador
Nine state-owned commercial banks had nonperforming loans averaging 
37%.
1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 
After a sharp stop in economic growth in 1996 associated with a terms-of-
trade deterioration (decline in coffee prices), the financial system got into 
stress from 1997 onwards. A small- to medium-sized institution (Banco 
Credisa), with a 5% market share, was closed.
1998 Jácome (2008)
Equatorial Guinea Two of the country's largest banks were liquidated. 1983–1985
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Eritrea Most of the banking system insolvent. 1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Estonia Failure of two medium-sized banks; panic lasts until January. November, 1930
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Estonia Waves of general bank runs. September, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Estonia
Insolvent banks accounted for 41% of financial system assets. Five banks' 
licenses were revoked and two major banks were merged and nationalized 
while two more merged and were converted to a loan recovery agency.
1992–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Estonia The Social Bank, with 10% of financial system assets, failed. 1994
Estonia Three banks failed in 1998. 1998
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Ethiopia Government-owned bank restructured and nonperforming loans taken over.  1994–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
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Finland
Crisis in Russia and Balkans and export prices put the finance sector at risk. 
The Bank of Finland extended loans, extended note issues, but the growth 
rate of real GDP still fell by 4%. 
1900
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999) 
Finland Fared better than other Nordic countries. 1921
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Finland
Recession began in 1929; many banks were stuck with large losses, which 
led to bankruptcies; the Bank of Finland faciliated with loans and mergers.
1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Finland Financial stability was maintained and GDP growth did not suffer too much. 1939
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Finland
A large bank (Skopbank) collapsed on September 19 and was intervened. 
Savings banks were badly affected; the government took control of three 
banks that together accounted for 31% of system deposits.
September, 
1991–1994
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001);  Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002)
France Bank of France: “serious crisis.”  1802 Conant (1915) 
France
Bank of France: Debt of 68 m fr with only 0.782 m fr in specie; used 
commercial paper, government bonds, and credit to buy specie (Spain, 
Treasury); occurred after formation of third coalition against France during 














March 24, 1848: notes from Bank of France and departmental banks 
declared legal tender; necessity for uniform paper currency led to 




France French panic after cotton speculation. January, 1864 Conant (1915) 





Suspension of operations by branches of Bank of France. After surrender, 
Germany suspended Bank of Strasburg, and the Bank of Prussia replaced 
Bank of France in Alsace-Lorraine. 
May, 1871 Conant (1915) 
France
Speculation and financial innovation led to problems among banks; Bank of 
France extended loans to smaller banks and borrowed from the Bank of 
England to replenish reserves. Growth fell by 5% that year and failed to 
recover to previous trend for a long time. 
February, 1882
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
France
France financier's attempt to corner the copper market while the Comptoir 
d'Escompte discounted copper warrants; product limits broke down and 
copper prices fell so the Comptoir suffered heavy losses. The head 
committed suicide, leading to a run—sound assets could not satisfy liquidity 
demands. Comptoir appealed to Bank of France for help; growth fell by 14% 
during the crisis. 
March, 1889
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
France
French banking panic; depression in Bourse since beginning of 
Russo–Japanese War.
February, 1904 Conant (1915) 
France
Trouble in the United States raised global demand for gold and money; 
majority of France's losses were in silver to its colonies. As a result, visible 
impact on GDP growth was mild. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
France Failure of two major banks; runs on provincial banks. 1930–1932
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
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France Crédit Lyonnaise had serious solvency problems. 1994–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Gabon One bank temporarily closed in 1995. 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Gambia In 1992, a government bank was restructured and privatized.  1985–1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Georgia
Most large banks virtually insolvent. About 1/3 of banking system loans 
were nonperforming.
1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Germany
Hamburg Bank: rescued by Austrian National Bank; restored confidence, 
dispelled crisis; repaid loan in six months.
1857 Conant (1915) 
Germany
Triggered by Russia's crisis; stock prices in Berlin fell by 61%; hit mortgage 
banks first, but discount banks provided liquidity. Dresdner Creditanstalt, 
Bank of Leipzig, and Leipzig Bank failed. Modest slowdown in the rate of 
growth. 
1901
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
Germany
Twin crisis in which banks were recapitalized or their deposits guaranteed 
by the government. Bank runs exacerbated troubles building since mid-1930; 
many banks unable to make payments and there was a bank holiday. 
1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Temin (2008); Bernanke 
and James (1990)
Germany Giro institutions faced problems. late 1970s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Ghana 7/11 banks insolvent; rural banking sector affected. 1982–1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Ghana
Nonperforming loans increased 11% to 27%; two state-owned banks were in 
bad shape and three others insolvent.
1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Greece 1931 Bordo et al. (2001)
Greece Localized problems required significant injections of public funds. 1991–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Reinhart (2002), 
Bordo et al. (2001)
Guatemala
Two small state-owned banks had a high level of nonperforming operations; 
closed in early 1990s.
1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
 
Three small banks (Banco Empresarial, Promotor, and Metropolitano), with 




The third largest bank, Bancafe (with 9% of deposits), was closed followed 
by another small bank, Banco del Comercio (with 1% of deposits), a few 
months later.
2006 Jácome (2008)
Guinea Six banks (with 99% of system deposits) deemed insolvent.
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Guinea
Two banks insolvent, one other had serious financial difficulties—45% of 
market total.
1993–1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Guinea-Bissau
End of 1995, 45% of commerical banks' loan portfolios were 
nonperforming.
1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Honduras A small bank, Bancorp, with 3% of deposits, was closed in September 1999.  1999 Jácome (2008)
Honduras A small bank, Banhcreser, with 3% of market share, was closed. 2001–2002 Jácome (2008)
 
Two small banks, Banco Sogerin and Banco Capital were intervened and 
taken over by the deposit insurance institution.
 Jácome  (2008)
Hong Kong Nine deposit-taking companies failed. 1982
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Hong Kong Seven banks liquidated or taken over. 1983–1986
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Hong Kong One large investment bank failed. 1998
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
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Hungary Run on Budapest banks; foreign withdrawals and bank holiday. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Hungary
By second half of 1993, eight banks (25% of financial system assets) were 
deemed insolvent.
1991–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Iceland One of three state-owned banks became insolvent. 1985–1986
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Iceland Government injected capital into state-owned commercial bank. 1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
India Central Bank of Western India went bankrupt in 1866. 1863
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a) 
India
Crop failures and excessive obligations to European banks; silver replaced 
much of the gold.
April, 1908 Conant (1915) 
India Nonperforming assets of 27 public banks estimated at 20% in 1995. 1993–1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Indonesia
A large bank (Bank Summa) collapsed and triggered runs on three smaller 
banks.
November, 1992
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
Indonesia
Nonperforming assets accounted for 14% of banking system assets with 
more than 70% in state banks.
1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Indonesia
Through May 2002, Bank Indonesia had closed 70 banks and nationalized 
13 out of 237. Nonperforming loans were 65–75% of total loans at the peak 
of the crisis and fell to about 12% in February 2002.
1997–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 





Tipperary Joint Stock Bank failed upon discovery that one director (John 
Sadlier) had systematically robbed the bank and falsified accounts.
February, 1856 Conant (1915) 
Israel
Almost the entire banking sector was affected, representing 60% of stock 
market recapitalization. The stock exchange closed for 18 days and bank 
share prices fell more than 40%.
1977–1983
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Israel Stocks of the four largest banks collapsed and were nationalized by the state. October, 1983 Reinhart (2002)
Italy
National Bank suspended specie due to expectation of the Austro-Prussian 
War. 
June, 1866–1868 Conant (1915) 
Italy
Tiber Bank, Italian Mortgage Bank Society and Naples Building Association 
taken over by National Bank.
1889 Conant (1915) 
Italy
Real estate boom and bust, bringing banks with it. Tariff war with France 
raised interest rates and helped to prick the land bubble. Growth slowed and 
did not pick up for five years. 
1891
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999) 
Italy
Government overhauled the banking system by merging several banks and 
authorized expansions of credit, triggering a currency crisis. The lira 
depreciated but the recessionary impact was mild. 
January, 1893
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
Italy
Financial speculation and mounting difficulties in New York, London, and 
Paris in 1906 put pressure on interest rates and pricked the financial bubble. 
Sharp drop in output followed. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999) 
Italy
Savings banks on the verge of collapse; rescued by the three main issuing 
banks, which also supported industry during the war.
1914
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Teichova et al. (1997)
Italy
Third and fourth largest banks became insolvent, partly due to overtrading 
during and after the war.
1921 Bordo et al. (2001)
Italy
Withdrawals from largest banks; panic ensued until April when government 
reorganized many institutions and took over bad industrial assets.
December 
1930–1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Italy
Agricultural bank closures, savings and commercial bank mergers to such an 
extent that the Italian banking system appeared completely reorganized.
1935
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Teichova et al. (1997)
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Italy Fifty-eight banks, with 11% of lending, merged with other institutions. 1990–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Jamaica A merchant banking group was closed. 1994–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Jamaica
FINSAC, a government resolution agency, assisted five banks, five life 
insurance companies, two building societies, and nine merchant banks.
1995–2000
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Japan
National Bank Act—banks forced to accept government's paper notes. 
Caused nine or ten banks to fail. 
1872–1876 Conant (1915) 
Japan
Deflationary measures depressed trade, and four national banks failed; five 
suspended, 10 consolidated.
1882–1885 Conant (1915) 
Japan
Trade deficits and reserve losses; significant output losses—growth fell by 
6% in one year. 
1901
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999) 
Japan
Tokyo stock market crash in early 1907 and global uncertainty; Bank of 
Japan intervened for some banks and let other banks fail. Recession was 
severe. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999)
Japan Japan went off the gold standard; prospered from war boom. 1917
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Flath
Japan
Tokyo earthquake led to bad debts which shook the Bank of Tokyo and 
Chosen. Restructured with government aid.
September, 1923
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Japan
Banking panic led to tighter regulation. Failure of Tokyo Watanabe bank led 
to runs and a wave of failures—15 banks unable to make payments. 
Government's unwillingness to bail out banks led to more uncertainty and 
other runs. Crisis resulted in bank consolidations.
April, 1927
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Japan
Banks suffered from sharp decline in stock market and real estate prices. In 
1995, estimates of nonperforming loans were $469–1000 billion or 10–25% 
of GDP; at the end of 1998 they were estimated at $725 billion or 18% of 
GDP; and in 2002 were 35% of total loans. Seven banks were nationalized, 
61 financial institutions closed, and 28 institutions merged. 
1992–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Jordan Third largest bank failed.
August, 
1989–1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Kenya 15% of financial system liabilities faced liquidity and solvency problems. 1985–1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Kenya Intervention in two local banks. 1992
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Kenya
Serious solvency problems with banks accounting for more than 30% of 
financial system assets.
1993–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Kenya Nonperforming loans reached 19%. 1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Korea Financial deregulation led to an increase in the number of banks. January, 1986
Reinhart (2002); Shin 
and Hahm (1998)
Korea
Through May 2002, five banks were forced to exit the market through a 
"purchase and assumption formula," and 303 financial institutions (215 were 
credit unions) shut down, and four banks were nationalized. Banking system 
nonperforming loans peaked between 30–40% and fell to about 3% by 
March 2002.
July, 1997
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
Kuwait About 40% of loans were nonperforming by 1986. 1980s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Kyrgyz Republic
About 80–90% of banking system loans doubtful. Four small banks closed 
in 1995.
1990s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Lao People's Dem 
Republic
Some banks experienced problems. Early 1990s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Latvia Run on banks with German connections; two large banks hit especially hard. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
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Latvia
Between 1995–1999, 35 banks saw their license revoked, were closed, or 
ceased operations.
1995–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Lebanon Four banks became insolvent and eleven resorted to Central Bank lending. 1988–1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Lesotho One of four commercial banks had nonperforming loans. 1988
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Liberia 7/11 banks not operational, accounting for 60% of bank assets. 1991–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Lithuania
In 1995, 12 small banks of 25 banks were liquidated; three private banks 
(29% of banking system deposits) failed, and three state-owned banks were 
deemed insolvent.
1995–1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Macedonia
About 70% of banking system loans were nonperforming. The government 
took over banks' foreign debt and closed the second largest bank.
1993–1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Madagascar 25% of bank loans deemed unrecoverable. 1988
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Malaysia
Runs against some branches of a large domestic bank, following the collapse 
of a related bank in Hong Kong. Insolvent institutions accounted for 3% of 
financial system deposits; marginally recapitalized and possibly insolvent 
institutions accounted for another 4%.
July, 1985–1988
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Malaysia
Finance company sector was restructured, and finance institutions reduced 
from 39 to 10 through mergers. Two finance companies were taken over by 
the Central Bank, including the largest independent finance company. Two 
banks deemed insolvent—accounting for 14% of financial system 
assets—will be merged with other banks. Nonperforming loans peaked 
between 25–35% of banking system assets and fell to 10.8% by March 2002.
September, 1997
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
Mali Nonperforming loans of largest bank reached 75%. 1987–1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Mauritania
In 1984, five major banks had nonperforming assets from 45–70% of their 
portfolios.
1984–1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Mauritius Central Bank closed 2/12 commercial banks for fraud and irregularities. 1996
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Mexico
Mexican government borrowed widely and then suspended payments (June 
1885); foreign investments fell leading to a credit crisis, bank runs, and 
banks stopped lending. National Bank and Mercantile Bank merged into 
National Bank of Mexico (Banamex) in 1884 to meet government’s demand 




Mexico National Bank absorbed Mexican Mercantile Bank, its main competitor. 1893 Conant (1915) 
Mexico
Severe credit shortage from U.S. crash; banks could not collect debts; 
Mexican Central Bank and many state banks failed. Other banks survived 
with federal assistance or by merging. Failures caused many bankruptcies 
and prevented economic activity.  Government cautioned against over-
expansion of credit—first a circular (Feb.) warned against unsafe loans; 
restrictions imposed in June.
February, 1908 Conant (1915) 
Mexico Suspension of payments after a run on major banks. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Mexico
Capital flight; government responded by nationalizing the private banking 
system.
1981–1982 Bordo et al. (2001)
Mexico Government took over banking system.
September, 
1982–1991
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999)  & Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) 
Mexico
Several financial institutions that held Ajustabonos were hurt by the rise in 
real interest rates in the second half of 1992.
October, 1992
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
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Mexico
In 1994, nine banks were intervened and 11 participated in the loan/purchase 
recapitalization program of 34 commercial banks. The nine banks accounted 
for 19% of financial system assets and were deemed insolvent. 1% of bank 
assets were owned by foreigner, and by 1998, 18% of bank assets were held 
by foreign banks. 
1994–1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); Jácome (2008)
Morocco Banking sector experienced problems. Early 1980s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Mozambique
Main commercial bank experienced solvency problems—apparent after 
1992.
1987–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Myanmar
Largest state-owned commercial bank reported to have large nonperforming 
loans.
1996–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Nepal
In early 1988, the reported arrears of three banks, accounting for 95% of the 
financial system, averaged 29% of assets.
1988
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Netherlands
Bank of Amsterdam closed by government decree; liquidation began in 




Netherlands 1897 Bordo et al. (2001)
Netherlands
Temporary closure of the Amsterdam Exchange led to a sharp acceleration 
in the evolution of banking. Large commercial banks replaced older 
institutions, and many banks were taken over or replaced.
1914
Bordo et al. (2001);  
'tHart et al. (1997)
Netherlands
Scores of banks failed and many others experienced serious problems. 
Banking crisis resulted in banks working more closely together and were 
characterized by more centralization. Banks financed industry more heavily 
after the war; after the crisis, industrial growth stalled.
1921
Bordo et al. (2001);  
'tHart et al. (1997)
Netherlands 1939 Bordo et al. (2001)
New Zealand
One large state-owned bank, with 25% of banking assets, experienced 
solvency problems with high nonperforming loans.
1987–1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Nicaragua Banking system nonperforming loans reached 50% in 1996. Late 1980s–96
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Nicaragua
Four out 11 banks, representing about 40% of deposits, were intervened and 
sold to other financial institutions.
2001–2002 Jácome (2008)
Niger
Mid-1980s, banking system nonperforming loans reached 50%. Four banks 
liquidated, three restructured in the late 80s; more restructuring in 2002.
1983–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Nigeria
In 1993, insolvent banks had 20% of banking system assets and 22% of 
deposits. In 1995, almost half the banks reported being in financial distress. 
1991–1995
Bordo et al. (2001); 
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Nigeria Distressed banks had 4% of banking system assets. 1997
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al.
Norway
Real estate speculation; bubble burst when interest rates increased, and many 
banks failed. Bank of Norway stepped in and prevented spreading crisis.
May, 1899
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Norway
Due to reckless lending during the war and the global downswing in the 
early 1920s.
1921–1923
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Norway
Norway abandoned the gold standard; the Norges Bank provided much 
support to smaller banks to prevent a systemic crisis. More successfully 
managed than the 1921 crisis.
1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Øksendal (2007)
Norway Legislation introducing a tax on bank deposits led to many withdrawals. 1936
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Norway
Two regional saving banks failed. The banks were eventually merged and 
bailed out. The Central Bank provided special loans to six banks suffering 
from the recession of 1985–86 and from problem real estate loans. The state 
took control of the three largest banks with 85% of banking system assets.
November, 
1988–1993
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001);  Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002)
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Panama
In 1988, the banking system had a nine-week banking holiday. The financial 
position of most state-owned and private commercial banks was weak and 
15 banks ceased operations.
1988–1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Papua New Guinea 85% of S&L associations ceased operations. 1989–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Paraguay
Bank of Paraguay and River Plate Bank suspended payments; subject to 
severe run—gold prices increased 300% and banks eventually liquidated.
1890 Conant (1915) 
Paraguay
The Government Superintendency intervened in most domestic private and 
public banks and a number of finance companies by the end of 1998, 
including the largest bank and savings & loan institution. By the end of 
1999, banks were mostly foreign-owned, with over 80% of bank assets in 
foreign hands. All banks were deemed sound in 2000.
1995–1999
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); Jácome (2008)
Paraguay
Two banks, with about 10% of deposits, were intervened and closed in 1997. 
A medium-sized bank, with 6.5% of deposits, was closed in 1998.
1997–1998 Jácome (2008)
Paraguay
The third largest bank, with nearly 10% of deposits, was intervened and 
closed.
2001–2002
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Jácome (2008)
Peru Gold coinage suspended and country on silver standard for 25 years.
December, 
1872–1873
Conant (1915); Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2008a)
Peru
Two large banks failed. The rest of the system suffered from high 
nonperforming loans and financial disintermediation following the 
nationalization of the banking system in 1987.
April, 1983–1990
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Peru
Capital outflows triggered a domestic credit crunch, which unveiled 
solvency problems in a number of banks, including Banco Wiese, Banco 
Latino (16.7% and 3% market share, respectively), and other smaller 
financial institutions. Bank resolution was applied to two banks (summing 




Commercial paper market collapsed, triggering bank runs and failure of 
nonbank financial institutions and thrift banks. Problems in two public banks 
accounting for 50% of banking system assets, six private banks accounting 
for 12% of banking system assets, 32 thrifts accounting for 53% of thrift 
banking assets, and 128 rural banks.
January, 
1981–1987
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Philippines
One commercial bank, seven of 88 thrifts, and 40 of 750 rural banks placed 
under receivership. Banking system nonperforming loans reached 12% by 
November 1998 and were expected to reach 20% in 1999.
July, 1997–1998
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003) 
Poland
Bank runs caused three large banks to stop payments; bank shakeout lasted 
until 1927.
July 1926–1927
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Poland
Run on banks, especially those associated with Austrian 
Creditanstalt—spread of Austrian crisis.
June, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Poland
In 1991, seven of nine treasury-owned commercial banks (90% of credit), 
the Bank for Food Economy, and the cooperative banking system 
experienced solvency problems.
1990s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Portugal
Bank of Lisbon suspended payments—consistently troubled career because 
tied with Portuguese government.
1828 Conant (1915) 
Portugal
Bank of Lisbon lost all credit, could not redeem notes, reorganized into the 
Bank of Portugal.  
May, 1846–1847 Conant (1915) 
Portugal
Large budget deficits, the Baring crisis, and the Brazilian revolution led to 
currency depreciation. Reneged on some domestic debt and renegotiated 
foreign debt to reduce interest payments. Large impact on growth. 
1891
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
Portugal 1920 Bordo et al. (2001)
Portugal 1923 Bordo et al. (2001)
Portugal 1931–1932 Bordo et al. (2001)
Romania Collapse of German-controlled banks and other banks; heavy runs on banks. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
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Romania
In 1998, nonperforming loans reached 25–30% in the six main state-owned 
banks.
1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Russia
Bank of Russia closed in April; specie payments suspended and never 
resumed. A permanent treasury deficit meant several loans were necessary 
and there was a hopeless credit situation. 
April, 1862–1863 Conant (1915) 
Russia
Skopine community bank garnered deposits from all over the empire but 
kept low reserves; bubble burst in 1875 when it could not pay its deposits; 
limited communal banking henceforth.
1875
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008a);  Conant (1915) 
Russia
Joint-Stock commercial banks loaded with nonperforming assets; many 
small banks failed although large ones were protected by the state bank.
1896 Cameron (1967)
Russia
The interbank loan market stopped working due to concerns about 
connected lending in many new banks.
August, 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Russia
Nearly 720 banks, representing half of those in operation, were deemed 
insolvent. The banks accounted for 4% of sector assets and 32% of retail 
deposits. Eighteen banks, holding 40% of sector assets and 41% of 
household deposits, were in serious difficulties and needed rescue.
1998–1999
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Rwanda One well-connected bank closed. 1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Santo Domingo
National Bank failed after unsuccessfully trying to adopt the gold standard; 
bank notes not accepted anywhere.
1894 Conant (1915) 
Sao Tome and 
Principe
End of 1992, 90% of monobank's loans were nonperforming. In 1993, 
monobank liquidated and two new banks were licensed and took over most 
assets. In 1994, credit operations at one new bank suspended. 
1980s–90s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Scotland
Western Bank Failure—brought on by reckless banking practices; bank 
made various bad loans to four firms—when discovered, the accounts were 
stopped and firms closed. There was a panic on the stock exchange; 





City of Glasgow Bank failure: falsification of books for three years, with 





Bank of Scotland absorbed Caledonian Bank, and North of Scotland Bank 
absorbed Town & Country Bank.
March, 1908 Conant (1915) 
Senegal
In 1988, 50% of loans were nonperforming. Six commercial banks and one 
development bank closed (20–30% of financial system assets). 
1988–1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al.
Sierra Leone
In 1995, 40–50% of banking system loans were 
nonperforming—undergoing bank recapitalization and restructuring.
1990
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Singapore Nonperforming loans rose to $200 million or 0.6% of GDP. 1982
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al.
Slovakia
In 1997, unrecoverable loans were estimated at 101 billion crowns—about 
31% of loans and 15% of GDP.
1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Slovenia Three banks (2/3 of banking system assets) were restructured. 1992–1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
South Africa Trust Bank experienced problems.
December, 
1977–1978
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Reinhart (2002); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
South Africa Some banks experienced problems. 1989
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Spain
During the Peninsular War, Spain was occupied by France, and Bank of St. 
Charles essentially dead since 1814; reorganized into Bank of St. Ferdinand 
in 1829.
1814–1817 Conant (1915) 
Spain Bank of St. Charles reorganized into Bank of Ferdinand. July, 1829 Conant (1915) 
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Spain
Bank of Isabella II (created by government to punish Bank of Ferdinand in 
1844) and Bank of Ferdinand consolidated into one, Bank of Ferdinand. 
Ferdinand bore Isabella’s debts and was completely at the mercy of the State.
In 1848, cash reserve of Bank decreasing, circulation increasing, 
government demanded more loans, victim of theft and embezzlement. 






Spain Failure of two major banks. 1924–1925
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Spain
Avoided the worst of the Great Depression by staying off the gold standard; 
experienced runs, but Bank of Spain could lend freely as a lender of last 
resort.
1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Temin (2008)
Spain
Bank of Spain began rescuing a number of smaller banks. In 1978–83, 24 
institutions were rescued, four were liquidated, four were merged, and 20 
small and medium-sized banks were nationalized. These 52 banks of 110, 




Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Sri Lanka
State-owned banks, comprising 70% of the banking system, estimated to 
have nonperforming loans of 35%.
1989–1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Swaziland Central Bank took over three other banks.
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Sweden
Depreciation of gold led to Bullion Report (similar to Report on Irish 
Currency in 1804).
January, 1811 Conant (1915) 
Sweden Severe banking crises. 1876–1879
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Sweden Jonung and Hagberg do not record a crisis. 1897
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Sweden
Lending boom and decreasing confidence in stability of banking system led 
to bank runs. Reserves depreciated but Riksbank extended loans to national 
banks. Output negatively affected, but the economy recovered quickly. 
1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002)
Sweden
One of severest banking crises in Swedish banking history; followed a steep 
recession.
1922–1923
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Sweden
Banks tied to the financier Ivar Kreuger suffered after his death; banks 
suffered large losses, but depositors were protected by the government and 
did not suffer from the failures.
1931–1932
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Jonung and Hagberg 
(2002)
Sweden
Swedish government rescued Nordbanken, the second largest bank. 
Nordbanken and Gota Bank, with 22% of banking system assets, were 
insolvent. Sparbanken Foresta, accounting for 24% of banking system assets, 
intervened. Five of the six largest banks, accounting for over 70% of 
banking system assets, experienced difficulties.
November, 
1991–1994
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001);  Jonung and 
Hagberg (2002)
Switzerland
Switzerland could not obtain its supply of coin from France; bank clients 
rushed to redeem their notes for coin; bank cut down discounts and loans, 
led to an economic downturn.
July, 1870–1871 Conant (1915) 
Switzerland Wave of bank failures and consolidations. 1910–1913 Vogler (2001)
Switzerland
Swiss banks badly shaken by German banking crisis; total assets shrank and 
many banks restructured.
1931
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Vogler (2001)
Switzerland
Continued distress due to pressures from America and the Great Depression 
and the German banking crisis of 1931.
1933
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Vogler (2001)
Taiwan Four trust companies and eleven corporations failed. 1983–1984
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
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Taiwan Failure of Changua Fourth sparked runs on other credit unions. July, 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Taiwan Banking system nonperforming loans estimated at 15% at the end of 1998. 1997–1998
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Tajikistan One of largest banks insolvent, one small bank closed. 1996–
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Tanzania
In 1987, main financial institutions had arrears amounting to half their 
portfolios. National Bank of Commerce, with 95% of banking system assets, 
became insolvent in 1990. 
late 1980s–90s
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Thailand
Following the stock market crash, one of the largest finance companies 
failed. The bailout of the financial sector began.
March, 1979
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999)
Thailand
Large losses in a finance company led to runs and government intervention. 
Authorities intervene in 50 finance and security firms and five commercial 
banks, or about 25% of financial system assets; three commercial banks 
deemed insolvent (14% of commercial bank assets).
October, 
1983–1987
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Thailand
As of May 2002, the Bank of Thailand shut down 59 of 91 financial 
companies (13% of financial system assets and 72% of finance company 
assets), one of 15 domestic banks, and nationalized four banks. A publicly 
owned assets management company held 29.7% of financial system assets as 
of March 2002. Nonperforming loans peaked at 33% of total loans and were 
reduced to 10.3% of total loans in February 2002.
May, 1996
Reinhart (2002); Caprio 
and Klingebiel (2003); 
Bordo et al. (2001)
Togo Banking sector experienced solvency problems. 1993–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Trinidad & Tobago
Several financial institutions faced solvency problems and three government-
owned banks merged.
1982–1993
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Tunisia Most commercial banks were undercapitalized. 1991–1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Turkey Runs on branches of German banks in wake of German crisis. July, 1931
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
Turkey
Start of the war led to massive withdrawals and a run on banks, prompting 
the government to guarantee all deposits.
January, 1991
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
Turkey
Three banks were merged with the state-owned Agriculture Bank and then 
liquidated; two large banks were restructured.
1982–1985
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Turkey Three banks failed in April 1994. April, 1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
Turkey
Two banks closed and 19 banks have been taken over by the Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund.
2000
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Uganda
During 1994–98: half the banking system faced solvency problems. During 
1998–2002: various banks recapitalized and privatized or closed.  
1994
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Ukraine
By 1997, 32 of 195 banks were being liquidated while 25 others were 
undergoing financial rehabilitation. Bad loans amounted to 50–65% of 
assets, even in some leading banks. In 1998, banks were further hit by the 
government's decision to restructure its debt.
1997–1998
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
United Kingdom
Mass speculation due to Napoleon’s Berlin Decree—many new country 
banks issued notes; excessive issue led to severe fall in London exchange; 
Treasury rescued banks on April 11, 1811.
January, 1811 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
Good harvest and low prices led to speculation; general depression on 
property prices affected production industries. Eighty-nine country banks 
bankrupt; 300–500 ceased business, and there was an increased demand for 
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United Kingdom
Speculation in real and imaginary investments financed by unregulated 
country banking caused a bubble in stocks and Latin American foreign 
sovereign debt; followed by a stockmarket crash, six London banks closed 
(including Henry Thornton’s Bank), 60 country banks closed—panic in 
London.
April, 1825–1826 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
Three banks failed (March 1837); Bank of England gave generous advances 
to other banks to prevent panic but still they drifted toward bankruptcy. 





The Irish Potato famine and railroad mania led to a steady drain on bullion; 
reduced resources led to a panic. Firms overextended into railroad endeavors 
and sugar plantations; firms began failing, which led to bank failures. 
April, 1847–1848 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
Discovery of Australian and Californian gold fields led to massive 
speculation and then collapse; paralyzed finances throughout world (spread 
from the United States to Europe, South America, and Far East). Most banks 
suspended; Bank of England the only source of discount.
August, 1857 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
Bank Act of 1844 suspended to deal with panic—paid demands in gold. 
Joint Stock Discount company failed and various industries discounted. 
May, 1866 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
Provincial bank crisis: West of England & South Wales District Bank failed 
(Dec. 9) and City of Glasgow bank failure (Oct. 2) due to depressed 
confidence.
October, 1878 Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom
House of Baring's portfolio was mostly in securities in Argentina and 
Uruguay. The Buenos Aires Water Supply & Drainage Company loan failed, 
but the Bank of England, assisted by the Bank of France and Russia, 
organized a rescue, which prevented Barings from failing. Short and mild 
recession followed.
November, 1890
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
United Kingdom "Secondary" banking crisis. 1974–1976
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
United Kingdom Johnson Matthey Bankers failure. 1984
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
United Kingdom Bank of Credit & Commerce International failure. 1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
United Kingdom Barings failure. 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
United States
State banks suspended specie payments due to War of 1812—paralyzed 
Treasury’s operations.
August, 1814 Conant (1915) 
United States
Forty-six banks rendered insolvent due to demands for specie by Second 





Preceded England’s crisis; Bank of the United States and all other banks 
brought to the verge of suspension.
January, 1825 Conant (1915) 
United States
Three banks failed (March 1837); Bank of England gave generous advances 
to other banks to prevent panic; failures began in New Orleans and NYC and 





Second Bank of the United States liquidated; lenders repaid but shareholders 
lost all interest; 26 local banks failed.
March, 1841 Conant (1915) 
United States
Discovery of Australian and Californian gold fields led to massive 
speculation and then collapse; paralyzed finances throughout world (spread 
from the United States to Europe, South America, and Far East). Most banks 
suspended; Bank of England the only source of discount.
August, 1857 Conant (1915) 
United States
Government suspended specie payments—lasted until 1879; drove up price 
of gold (peaked in 1864) and all other retail items.
December, 1861 Conant (1915) 
United States U.S. panic due to the Civil War. April, 1864 Conant (1915) 
United States
Philadelphian banking firm Jay Cooke & Company failed, triggering a 
recession that lasted until 1877.
September, 1873 Conant (1915) 
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United States
Weak commodity prices and a series of brokerage firm failures led to bank 
runs and suspended payments, mostly in the NY region. The output effects 
were mild. 
May, 1884
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999), Conant (1915) 
United States
Monetary uncertainty and stock market crash led to bank runs. Political 
action to ameliorate the crisis; severe decline in output but the economy 
recovered quickly. 
May, 1893
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
United States
Global credit restrictions and domestic financial excesses, increasing number 
of state banks, and a rising ratio of deposits to cash reserves set the stage for 
a crisis. Real estate and stock speculations burst; crisis spread from NY 
nationwide. Growth rate fell by 9% per year. JP Morgan, the Bank of 
Montreal, and the Treasury of NY replenished liquidity. 
March, 1907
Bordo and Eichengreen 
(1999); Conant (1915) 
United States
NYSE closed until December in response to the War; however, a banking 
crisis was avoided by flooding the country with emergency currency to 
prevent hasty withdrawals.
July, 1914 Bordo et al. (2001)
United States
Great Depression: thousands of banks closed; failures correlated with 
particular Federal Reserve district. Bank of USA failed in December 1930; 
between August 1931 and January 1932, 1860 banks failed.
1929–1933
Bordo et al. (2001);  
Bernanke and James 
(1990)
United States 1400 S&L and 1300 bank failures. 1984–1991
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); 
Uruguay National Bank failed. 1893 Conant (1915) 
Uruguay
Run on banks to redeem bank notes due to government decree to reduce the 
circulation of notes.
September, 1898 Conant (1915) 
Uruguay
Banco Mercantil failed. A wave of bank mergers and bankruptcies 
developed, driven by high real interest rates.
March, 1971
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) 
Uruguay
A large-scale run on banks came in the wake of the Argentine devaluation, 
which marked the end of the Argentine tablita. Affected institutions 
accounted for 30% of financial system assets; insolvent banks accounted for 
20% of financial system deposits.
March, 
1981–1984
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001)
Uruguay
The Government-owned mortgage bank was recapitalized in December 
2001. The banking system had 33% of its deposits withdrawn in the first 
seven months of 2002. In 2002, four banks were closed (33% of total bank 
assets), and fixed-term deposits (CDs) were restructured and their maturity 
extended.
2002
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Jácome (2008)
Venezuela Notable bank failures in 1978, 1981, 1982, 1985, 1986 1978–1986
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001); 
Venezuela
Bank runs on Banco Latino, the country's second largest bank—closed in 
January 1994. Insolvent banks accounted for 35% of financial system 
deposits. Authorities intervened in 17 of 47 banks that held 50% of deposits 
and nationalized nine banks and closed seven more in 1994. The government 
intervened in five more banks in 1995. 
October, 
1993–1995
Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999); Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003); Bordo 
et al. (2001); Jácome 
(2008)
Vietnam
Two of four large state-owned commercial banks (51% of banking system 
loans) deemed insolvent; the remaining two experience significant solvency 
problems. Several joint stock companies in severe financial distress. Banking
system nonperforming loans reached 18% in late 1998.
1997–?
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Yemen
Banks suffered from extensive nonperforming loans and heavy foreign 
currency exposure.
1996–
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Zambia Meridian Bank with 13% of commercial bank assets became insolvent. 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Zimbabwe Two of five commercial banks have a high level of nonperforming loans. 1995
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003); Bordo et al. 
(2001)
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